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_ America's Duty 



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America's Duty 



A» Shown by 

Our Military History 
Its Facts and Fallacies 



By 

Leonard Wood 

Major General U. S. Army 




The Reilly 8C Lee Co. 
Chicago 






Copyright, 1921 

By 

The Reilly & Lee Co. 



Made In U. S. A. 



America's Duty 

MAR 29 1921 
©CI.A611374 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

I The Cost of Unpreparedness 9 

II The Struggle for Peace . . 30 

III Past National Policy 53 

IV Lessons of the Revolution 84 

V Seventy Years of Ineffi- 
ciency 117 

VI The Price of Unprepared- 
ness IN THE Sixties 143 

VII The Value of Prepared- 
ness 160 

Wpiat We Should Do. . . .183 

Constructive Work of the 
Army 203 

X Lessons of the World War.216 

Appendix 240 

The Australian System 
OF Defense 240 

The Swiss System of De- 
fense 248 



FOREWORD 

Panic patriotism appears from time 
to time when the clouds of possible 
trouble loom more heavily than usual. 
There is much discussion, some feverish 
activity, but little accomplishment. 

Adequate national preparedness on 
sound lines will be secured only when 
there is a general appreciation of its 
vital importance for defense and of the 
further fact that it can not be impro- 
vised or done in a hurry. It includes 
both moral and material organization. 

Military preparedness, which includes 
preparation on land and sea, should go 
hand and hand with a nation's policy. 
Our policy is not one of aggression, but 
one which looks only to a secure defense. 
Consequently, the arrangements for our 
military establishment should be limited 
to the needs of a secure and certain 



Foreword 

national defense against any force which 
may be brought against us. 

A brief review of our past military 
policy, its shortcomings and cost, may 
aid ill establishing an appreciation of 
our needs. 

Fort Sheridan, Illinois. 
November Seventeenth. 
Nineteen Twenty. 

The World War has come and gone, 
so far as our participation is concerned. 
We were unprepared in every depart- 
ment. We paid the price in blood and 
treasure. 

There is nothing in existing condi- 
tions which in any way justifies failure 
to provide a sound system of national 
defense. America must ever be ready 
to throw the weight of her influence for 
justice and the maintenance of righteous 
peace. This influence will be most 
effective in preventing war if we are 



Foreword 

reasonably ready to make our protest 
promptly effective. 

A resolute spirit, fair dealing, respect 
for the rights of others, earnest desire 
and effort for the peace of righteous- 
ness must go hand in hand with the 
mofal and physical organization of our 
resources both in men and material, if 
our voice is to have the weight for peace 
which it should have. 

We have disregarded the lessons of 
our other wars. Let us give heed to 
those of the World War. 

Leonard Wood. 



America's Duty 



chapter i 
The Cost of Unpreparedness 

"Our culture must, therefore, not 
omit the arming of the man." 

— Emerson. 

Wars and rumors of wars world-wide 
in extent have aroused to an unusual 
degree the interest of the American 
people in their own military problems, 
especially the question of national de- 
fense, including, as it must, the organi- 
zation of national resources. 

There is a failure on the part of our 
people to appreciate the defects of our 
military organization in the past, and 

9 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

a tendency growing out of this state of 
misinformation as to what has been really 
done, to continue to place too much de- 
pendence upon a military policy found 
gravely defective, even to the extent of 
endangering success and in most instances 
making it unecessarily costly. 

There is still a general lack of appre- 
ciation of the fact that military opera- 
tions, in order to be effective, must be 
conducted by highly trained, well organ- 
ized and equipped forces, and that such 
training, organization and equipment re- 
quire much time and must be accom- 
panied by an organization of industrial 
resources, all in complete readiness in 
advance of the day of trouble. 

There is a general tendency to consider 
that our geographical position renders 
us secure from invasion and that our 
numbers, resources and wealth would be 

10 



COST OF UNPREPAREDNESS 

a secure defense if we should be attacked. 
These very dangerous misconceptions are 
largely due to a failure on the part of 
our educational institutions, public and 
private, to teach properly our military 
history, and especially to their failure 
to pl-esent that side of it which relates 
to the methods employed in the conduct 
of our military establishment in the past. 
With few exceptions, the teaching of 
the military history of our country has 
not been such as to give the people a 
correct idea of our military achievments 
or of the conditions under which military 
operations have been conducted. As a 
rule, students leave school, and even 
college, not only with superficial know- 
ledge, but often with entirely incorrect 
ideas concerning our achievments in war. 
They know little or nothing of the sys- 
tem under which we have raised and 

11 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

maintained our armies, still less of the 
unecessary cost in life and treasure which 
has characterized the conduct of our 
wars, or the reasons therefor. Only too 
often the real facts of our failures are 
overlooked and the account of our suc- 
cesses exaggerated. The schools teach 
the dates of battles and the names of 
commanding generals, but nothing of the 
organization which determined the effi- 
ciency of military operations in our var- 
ious wars. 

The natural result has been an un- 
warranted degree of confidence, a con- 
fidence which has grown into a belief 
that we always have been easily success- 
ful in war; that, in the language of the 
Fourth of July orator, we can defeat a 
world in arms. The effect of this lack 
of sound information is not limited by 
any means to those in private life, but 

12 



COST OF UNPREPAREDNESS 

too often characterizes the remarks of 
those in places of trust and responsibility 
who should know better. The result of 
this general failure to teach correctly 
our military history, and of the resulting 
misinformation concerning it, is seen in 
the general lack of interest in our mili- 
tary situation, ignorance of the most ele- 
mentary facts concerning our military 
establishment, its organization, strength, 
equipment and needs. 

There is a lack of information also as 
to the nation's resources in men and 
material, both mechanical and chemical. 
Americans are unaware that this country 
is depending upon sea control for many 
of these, and are uninformed as to the 
time required to make arms and ammu- 
nition. Intelligent public interest in ade- 
quate preparedness has been so long 
dormant, and ignorance of the need of 

13 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

it is so general, that our people do not 
appreciate how many links in our indus- 
trial and chemical chain are wanting, 
how many breaks are tied together with 
string, how helpless the nation would 
be in certain lines of endeavor without 
these missing necessities. 

They are cheerfully confident that an 
untrained American is as effective in 
war as a highly trained and equally well 
educated foreigner of equal physical 
strength and intelligence. There is a 
lack of appreciation of the fact that will- 
ingness does not mean fitness or ability. 
This condition of mind is imdoubtedly 
ascribable to the fact that we have been 
actively engaged in matters in no way 
relating to our military establislmient, 
an immense work has been accomplished 
in developing our resources. We are 
entitled to credit for what we have done, 

14 



COST OF UNPREPAREDNESS 

and we can justly take much pride in 
it. We now need pitiless publicity as 
to the defects in our military system, 
organization and resources, which have 
characterized them and endangered our 
safety in all our past wars. 

Tlie general lack of information and 
interest in military matters is the result 
of various causes; but first and foremost 
is the want of sound teaching of our 
national history, especially its military 
side, and an unwarranted sense of se- 
curity because of our assumed inaccesi- 
bility. It is also due in a measure to 
our rapid expansion, accompanied by 
the development of our vast resources. 
We have unconsciously come to look 
upon the size, wealth and population of 
our country as sufficient protection, for- 
getting that without the organization 
of our resources and the training of our 

15 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

men these will be of little value against 
lesser forces well organized and prepared, 
and ignoring also the further fact that 
valuable territory, great wealth, and 
commercial aggressiveness, accompanied 
by weak arrangements for defense, are 
always an incentive to attack. 

For many years after the Civil War 
we had a large, well-trained, though 
unorganized, reserve of officers and men 
who had seen service. This fact gave 
us for many years a sense of security 
which was well justified. Gradually 
this reserve of well-trained men has 
passed away. 

The Spanish War gave little training, 
as did the Philippine insurrection. Cam- 
paigns of this kind are of limited value 
as a preparation for war with an organ- 
ized prepared power. Our reserves to- 
day are reserves in name only and con- 

16 



COST OF UNPREPAREDNESS 

sist of those trained but unlisted and 
unloeated men who have served in our 
army and have gone back into the mass 
of the people, forgotten and unheeded, 
valuable material lost. Their number 
is only a fraction in comparison with 
the well-trained alien reservists living in 
this country but owing military obliga- 
tion to their home countries. The bal- 
ance of our reserve consists of the wholly 
untrained and unprepared men of our 
population, of little military value until 
trained. 

The general failure to impress upon 
our people the defects, weakness and 
unreliability of our militia and volunteer 
systems in the past, has resulted in an 
unwarranted degree of dependency upon 
them as reliable instruments of defense, 
a dependence which is not warranted by 
a careful study of the real facts of our 

17 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

military history; a dependence, which, 
if continued, will cost us dearly in case 
of war with an organized military power 
of the first class. 

The spirit of the officers and men who 
served under these systems, and are now 
serving under one of them, is good, but 
neither of the systems will stand the 
test of war with an organized and train- 
ed force. They will crumple up at the 
first heavy impact of such a force. The 
reason will not be the physical or moral 
deficiency of the men, but the fact that 
they will be untrained. If all great na- 
tions were trusting to military props of 
the type of these, the condition as to 
possible defense would not be so serious, 
but even in this case the waste of life 
in camp and field from ignorance of the 
proper care of men and lack of train- 
ing for leading them in action, should 

18 



COST OF UNPREPAREDNESS 

condemn these systems on the ground 
of plain humanity/ 

The danger of depending on these 
systems or upon either one of them 
should be made clear to our people in 
order that their support may be had in 
establishing a sound policy, one which 
will give the largest measure of insur- 
ance against war, one which will, if war 
be forced upon us, enable us to conduct 
it with the minimum loss of life. We 
have no right to employ the services of 
loyal and willing men under a system 
which insures the maximum loss of life 
and the minimum of success, a system 
which has been condemned by military 
experts the world over, including our 

^Every American should read Emory Upton's 
Military Policy of the United States, and follow 
it up with Huidekoper's work, which brings the 
statement of our military policy, or lack of it, up 
to date. 

19 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

own. A continuance of these systems, 
or either one of them, invites attack 
and greatly increases the probabihty of 
defeat. The real facts of our military 
history make these conclusions so abso- 
lutely clear that he who runs may read. 

'' In time of peace prepare for war! " 
This was the advice of George Wash- 
ington. It was drawn from the expe- 
rience of all time. The advice was 
sound and conservative when given. It 
is of even more importance to-day, for 
the reason that organization, prepara- 
tion, rapidity of transportation, have 
all tremendously increased the rapidity 
of the onset of modern war. 

There is nothing particularly new in 
the condition of the world to-day, so 
far as our own situation is concerned, 
as the following extracts from the mes- 
sages of the early presidents indicate. 

20 



COST OF UNPREPAREDNESS 

As one reads them he cannot fail to be 
impressed with the fact that with the 
change of a word here and there they 
are as applicable to conditions to-day 
as when written. 

On December 3, 1799, President John 
Adams, in his third annual address, spoke 
as follows: 

" At a period like the present, when 
momentous changes are occuring and 
every hour is preparing new and great 
events in the political world, when a 
spirit of war is prevalent in almost 
every nation with whose affairs the inter- 
ests of the United States have any con- 
nection, unsafe and precarious would be 
our situation were we to neglect the 
means of maintaining our just rights. 
The result of the mission to France is 
uncei-tain; but however it may terminate 
a steady perseverance in a system of 

21 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

national defense commensurate with our 
resources and the situation of our coun- 
try is an obvious dictate of wisdom; for, 
remotely as we are placed from the 
belligerent nations, and desirous as we 
are, by doing justice to all, to avoid 
offense to anj% nothing short of the 
power of repelling aggressions will se- 
cure to our country a rational prospect 
of escaping the calamities of war or 
national degradation." 

A few years later, December 3, 1805, 
in his fifth annual message. President 
Thomas Jefferson said: 

" In reviewing these injuries from 
some of the belligerent powers, the mod- 
eration, the firmness and the wisdom 
of the Legislature will all be called into 
action. We ought still to hope that 
time and a more correct estimate of 
interest, as ^vell as of character, will 

22 



COST OF UNPREPAREDNESS 

produce the justice we are bound to 
expect. But should any nation deceive 
itself by false calculations, and disap- 
point that expectation, we must join in 
the unprofitable contest of trying which 
party can do the other the most harm. 
Some of these injuries may perhaps 
admit a peaceable remedy. Where that 
is competent it is always the most 
desirable. But some of them are of a 
nature to be met wdth force only, and 
all of them may lead to it. I can not, 
therefore, but recommend such prepar- 
ations as circumstances call for." 

Two years later, on October 27, 1807, 
in his seventh annual message, Jeffer- 
son made the following statements: 

" Circumstances, fellow citizens, w^hich 
seriously threatened the peace of our 
country have made it a duty to convene 
you at an earlier period than usual. 

23 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

The love of peace so much cherished 
in the bosoms of our citizens, which has 
so long guided the proceedings of their 
public councils and induced forbearance 
under so many wrongs, may not insure 
our continuance in the quiet pursuits 
of industry. The many injuries and 
depredations committed on our commerce 
and navigation upon the high seas for 
years past, the successive innovations on 
those principles and usage of nations 
as the rule of their rights and peace, 
and all the circumstances w^hich induced 
the extraordinary mission to London 
are already known to you. 

" Under the acts of March 11 and 
April 23, respecting arms, the difficulty 
of procuring them from abroad during 
the present situation and dispositions of 
Europe, induced us to direct our whole 
efforts to the means of internal supply. 

24 



COST OF UNPREPAREDNESS 

The public factories have therefore 
been enlarged, additional machineries 
erected, and, in proportion as artificers 
can be found or formed, their effect, 
already more than doubled, may be 
increased so as to keep pace with the 
yearly increase of the militia. The an- 
nual sums appropriated by the latter 
act have been directed to the encour- 
agement of private factories of arms, 
and contracts have been entered into 
w^ith individual undertakers to nearly 
the amount of the first year's appro- 
priation." 

On February 18, 1815, President 
James Madison, in a special message, 
said: 

" Experience has taught us that neither 
the pacific dispositions of the American 
people nor the pacific character of their 
political institutions can altogether ex- 

25 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

empt them from that strife which appears 
beyond the ordinary lot of nations to be 
incident to the actual period of the 
world, and the same faithful monitor 
demonstrates that a certain degree of 
preparation for war is not only indis- 
pensable to avert disasters in the onset, 
but affords also the best security for the 
continuance of peace." 

And on December 5, 1815, in his 
seventh annual message, Madison wrote 
as follows: 

'* Notwithstanding the security for 
future repose which the United States 
ought to find in their love of peace and 
their constant respect for the rights of 
other nations, the character of the times 
particularly inculcates the lesson that, 
whether to prevent or repel danger, we 
ought not to be unprepared for it. This 
consideration will sufficiently recommend 

26 



COST OF UNPREPAREDNESS 

to Congress a liberal provision for the 
immediate extension and gradual com- 
pletion of the works of defense, both 
fixed and floating, on our maritime fron- 
tier, and an edequate provision for guard- 
ing our inland frontier against dangers 
to -which certain portions of it may con- 
tinue to be exposed." 

The foregoing are quoted at some 
length for the purpose of pointing out 
that there is nothing new in the advice 
which is being given us for prepara- 
tion. The general conditions under which 
nations live always render adequate prep- 
aration necessary, and our country is 
no exception to the rule. We stand to- 
day after a period of a hundred years 
as we shall probably stand a hundred 
years hence, in a position that renders 
adequate measures of defense absolutely 
necessary, if we consider our institutions 

27 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

and our rights worth defending, and 
are to defend them successfully against 
powerful adversaries. 

Our presidents throughout the entire 
period of our national life have con- 
stantly warned our people with refer- 
ence to preparedness, not only as a 
measure necessary for the successful 
conduct of war, but more often as a 
means of preventing war. It is time that 
we finally take heed. 

International relations are in a little 
less precarious condition in these days, 
speaking of the world at large, because 
the telegraph, the wireless, and rapid 
transmission of dispatches to all por- 
tions of the world, make full and prompt 
explanation of misunderstandings pos- 
sible. On the other hand, rapid trans- 
port and complete organization make 
preparation even more necessary, as less 

28 



COST OF UNPREPAREDNESS 

time is given to prepare after war is 
decided upon. 

Earnest efforts have been made for 
arbitration and the maintenance of world 
peace, but, as present conditions indicate, 
success is still remote, and every nation, 
while striving for peace, must make 
adequate preparation to defend its life. 



29 



chapter ii 
The Struggle for Peace 

"But in demonstrating by our con- 
duct that we do not fear war in the 
necessary protection of our rights and 
honor, we should give no room to infer 
that we abandon the desire of peace. 
An efficient preparation for war can 
alone secure peace." — John Adams, 
Second Annual Message. 

There is nothing new in the move- 
ment for peace. It is centuries old. 
Men have dreamed of it since they had 
things of value to hold. Women have 
prayed for it through the ages. Good 
people have looked forward to the day 
of peace and tranquility since the begin- 
ning of written history, and doubtless 
long before. Just as they have desired 

30 



THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE 

to avoid great misfortunes, plagues, 
earthquakes, fire, or famine, so they have 
struggled to escape war, except in those 
instances where war was the lesser of 
two evils. Yet war is with us today, 
was with us yesterday, and so through 
all the years since history records man's 
action or tradition tells of his deeds. 

Today, initiated as a rule with more 
formality, conducted with greater regard 
for the lives of the noncombatants, and 
characterized by a larger measure of 
observance of the dictates of humanity 
in the treatment of prisoners and the 
helpless, war is still with us. Peace 
leagues struggle to prevent it; great 
alliances attempt to abate it through 
preponderant forces — through war itself, 
if need be. 

Arbitration serves to lessen it a little 
through disposing of many minor ques- 

31 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

tions which, if allowed to grow, might 
bring about disputes resulting in war. 
^^ one of the means of possible avoid- 
ance of a resort to force, we welcome 
arbitraton with open arms and strive 
to give it the largest measure of success, 
although realizing that in many cases 
it will not avail to prevent that final 
resort to force which can only be avoided 
when all great powers think alike. That 
time will come only when absolutely 
unselfish justice marks international re- 
lations; when trade is equitably shared 
among competing peoples; when ^the 
rich help freely the poor ; when com- 
petition, greed, selfishness, race interests 
and prejudices and religious intolerance 
pass away; when men and nations have 
no fixed convictions which differ from 
those of others; when they neither dream 
dreams nor see visions. Until then, 

32 



THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE 

strive as we may, the cry will be '' Peace! 
JPeace!" and yet there will be no per- 
manent peace. Nevertheless, we must 
strive unceasingly to reduce war to the 
minimum, and to build up arbitration, 
but in so doing we must not lose sight 
of fhe fact that our efforts will not 
alwiys be successful. 

An infinite wisdom has established the 
conditions under which we live and put 
in being the great law which runs 
through the universe; the law of the 
survival of the most fit. We may 
struggle against it, but it rules in its 
general application. The most fit in 
a military way, which includes good 
bodies based on good food, careful sani- 
tation, well thought-out training, clear 
intelligence resting on good schools and 
early training, good armament, equip- 
ment and organization, all springing 

33 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

from intelligence and education applied 
to self -protect ion and expansion of inter-^ 
ests and trade, will win in war just as 
they wun in commerce. 

They may not be the most fit in 
abstract morality as relates to business 
relations between individuals or nations, 
or with regard to generosity or sense 
of justice. The characteristics of sel- 
fishness, self-interest and the spirit of 
acquisitiveness are often accompanied by 
a development of the means to get what 
is coveted and to hold it securelv. 
Human nature in the mass is still human 
nature; under a little more restraint, 
perhaps, but still the old complex prop- 
osition of the ages, characterized and 
controlled only too often by expediency 
and self-interest. I 

Nations are but collections of individ- 
uals; we need courts for the individual 

34 



THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE 

man, and courts are of no avail without 
the police. In the vast group of indi- 
viduals constituting a community, city 
or nation, the resort to force by small 
groups representing perhaps a thous- 
andth, or less, of the population, is a 
nuisance and is not permitted by the 
great aggregation of the individuals 
among whom they live, as it interferes 
with the interest and activities, often 
safety, of too many other people. The 
individuals in the community of nations 
are few in number, and it is much less 
easy to bring preponderant force to 
the control or restraint of the more 
powerful. 

Yet as men struggle within the com- 
munitj^ and too often resort to force 
unless restrained, so do nations stnjggle 
and resort to force in the world com- 
munity, only here counter force in the 

35 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

form of international police has never 
been resorted to. Can it be effectively 
done while there still exist strong groups 
characterized by century-old prejudices 
of race and interest This is one of the 
great questions of the hour. While con- 
sidering it we should not neglect pre- 
paration for defense or fail to recognize 
conditions as they are. 

The maintenance of peace and the 
prevention of war have been attempted 
through alliances to compel or regulate 
the action of other groups or other 
combinations of nations, by efforts so 
to group nations as to maintain the 
balance of power between people whose 
territorial expansion and increase of 
population and interests might other- 
wise jeopardize peace. These efforts 
have usually resulted in war sooner or 
later, although in many instances serv- 

36 



THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE 

ing to maintain peace for long periods. 
The policy of no combination satisfies 
the greed, ambition or policy of all its 
members, and eventually the dominating 
interest of one or more members of 
such a combination, or the injection of 
new interests or conditions, serves after 
a time to bring about the loosening of 
the bonds of the alliance and the form- 
ation of new combinations, too often 
with a resort to force as the final argu- 
ment. 

Thus far we see little prospect of 
change. We may hold down for a 
time the explosive pressure or give it a 
safe vent, but from time to time human 
effort will fail and the explosion will 
occur. In other words, the controlling 
nations are too few in number and 
their vital interests are so coincident or 
interwoven with those of the controlled 

37 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

nations that constant changes and rear- 
rangements result in this grouping, and 
these changes inevitably bring about an 
appeal to force. It is difficult to see 
how this condition can be changed so 
long as national lines exist and racial 
groups continue, or certain trade areas 
remain under the control of these groups. 

Justice and righteousness are not 
enough to insure protection, nor is an 
upright and blameless personal or nation- 
al life a guarantee against the unscrupu- 
lous. A Pilate was found to crucify 
Christ; and a strong aggressive nation, 
believing in its own worth and right to 
expand, has always been prone to crush 
and coerce a weaker one, regardless of 
the abstract justice of the weaker nation's 
cause. 

Why all these things are, is a ques- 
tion which this world cannot answer in 

38 



THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE 

precise terms, and with such answer we 
are not now concerned. But we are con- 
cerned with the existence of the condition. 
We can with justice say that pubhc 
and national morahty is largely tlie reflec- 
tion of the education of our youth. Given 
sound moral training in the home, a 
healthy body and a developed sense 
of justice and fair play, and you have 
the youth who will most probably make 
the sound, just and normal man in pub- 
lic life, the best citizen, and, collectively, 
when assembled in legislative bodies or 
engaged in executive or administrative 
work, the man who will act on the most 
just, reasonable and tolerant lines. But 
even among men of this class there will 
be strong differences of opinion and 
it is little short of folly to assume the 
contrary. We may diminsh the fre- 
quency of strife and make more humane 

39 



AMERICA'S DUTY v 

the struggle, but for the present/nothing 
more. 

Blood, race, tradition, trade and a 
host of other influences, capped by am- 
bition to go on, to lead, to expand, 
will always produce strife. We cannot 
escape this conclusion if we take as our 
guide the evidence of things done and 
being done, rather than follow the dic- 
tates of fancy or desire. The struggle 
for peace is centuries old, and efforts 
to end war and establish undisturbed 
peace have filled the minds of men and 
taxed the resources of nations. The 
great combinations of power to prevent 
war, were, after all, but combinations 
of forces to restrain the exercise of 
force, and have more often than not 
ended in a great struggle for readjust- 
ment of the balance of power. 

The theories and policies of addled 

40 



THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE 

minds and shallow intelligences, prod- 
ucts of the applause of the lecture plat- 
form, or of minds upset by the flattery 
incident to sudden wealth, have had 
their share of attention, and even of 
sympathy. After all, they indicate only 
a failure to understand that war gener- 
ally has its roots running deep below 
the surface that is swept by the gaze 
of such observers. The authors of these 
theories never have studied seriously the 
causes of war. They assign as causes 
the little incidents which serve to touch 
off the mass of explosive which other 
forces have been accumulating and piling 
up for a generation or perhaps a century. 
War, whether it be for evil or good, 
is among men, and our clear duty is 
to recognize this fact, instead of deny- 
ing the evidence of our senses simply 
because it is disagreeable and brutal, 

41 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

something that we would get rid of. 
Our duty is to protect ourselves as best 
we can against war and build our pro- 
tection on so secure a foundation and 
maintain its efficiency so systematically 
that our own institutions, ideals and 
interests msLj be secure and that we 
may be able to hand down to our chil- 
dren all the benefits w^e have received 
from our fathers. God has given us 
ej'^es to see, ears to hear, and intelligence 
and memory to glean and carry from 
the lessons of the past something of 
wisdom to guide us in meeting the issues 
of the present. If we fail to make the 
best use of those faculties which have 
been given us, w^e must pay the penalty. 
We must continue to strive for world 
peace, for the betterment of human 
conditions; we must do what we can to 
promote arbitration, love of justice; but 

42 



THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE 

we have no right to forget that none of 
these will serve to protect us against 
an unjust aggressor. Let us do all 
these good things, but at the same time 
take those measures of wise precaution 
which the experience of time and of all 
people teaches, that we may be pre- 
pared to defend with force those things 
which justice, honesty and fair dealing 
are inadequate of themselves to defend? 
As Cromwell said: "Trust in God — 
but keep your powder dry." In other 
words, do right, but do not trust to that 
alone. The highwayman is not especially 
concerned with the morals of the man 
whose purse he covets, nor is the great 
nation struggling for trade and expan- 
sion disposed to give especial consider- 
ation to the morals of the people standing 
in her way. Every nation does, how- 
ever, give serious and prompt heed to 

43 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

the strength and abihty of another to 
hold and protect what she has. 

After going over the evidence of past 
results and present conditions, we must 
realize that arbitration to-day cannot as 
a rule be depended upon for protection 
or even as a means of delaying a resort 
to force, except in such cases as are not 
of vital importance to either of the dis- 
putants. Questions of citizenship, cases 
arising under the Monroe Doctrine — 
in which we are particularly interested — 
are among those which cannot well be 
turned over to arbitration. Our interests 
in them are vital. 

Preparedness to resist injustice or 
attack with force tends to amplify the 
possibilities of successful arbitration, as 
the cost and danger of the struggle and 
the uncertainty of the outcome are evi- 
dent. Preparedness lends weight to just 

44 



THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE 

claims and makes the would-be aggres- 
sor hesitate. It is the well-guarded house 
in which the robber sees the danger and 
realizes the cost. It does not mean 
that the people of the house are less 
just because they have had the good 
sense to recognize conditions and take 
the wise measure of proteci;ion. 

All arbitration has a much better 
chance of success when each party rea- 
lizes that the other has the ability to 
make strong opposition to unjust claims. 
A countr}^ unable to defend her rights 
on land and sea is not the country to 
determine whether arbitration or force 
is to be resorted to. It is the strong, 
well-prepared nation which will deter- 
mine whether a dispute is to be settled 
by arms or arbitration, not the weak 
and unprepared one. 

Washington's words still hold good: 

4.5 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

" To be prepared for war is one of the 
most effectual means of preserving 
peace." The assertion so often made 
that preparedness increases the proba- 
bihty of war, is unsound from every 
standpoint, unless those who make the 
assertion assume that we should not 
engage in war in any case but rather 
submit passively to whatever demands 
are made upon us. The resort to aggres- 
sive force will always be governed to 
a certain extent by the question of cost 
— cost in men and treasure. If no seri- 
ous resistance is possible on the part of 
one party to a dispute, the temptation 
of the stronger and better prepared to 
use force is great; if the reverse is the 
case, consideration and a disposition to 
arbitrate may be counted on. 

Every dictate of common sense, the 
teaching of history and the lessons of 

46 



THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE 

the moment, suggest strongly and unmis- 
takably the urgent necessity of the 
organization of the might of the nation, 
in order that we may be ready to meet 
force with force, if other means fail. 
Reliance on peace treaties is not a safe 
policy. Experience shows they often 
mean little in the face of a great crisis 
threatening the life and interests of a 
nation. 

Preparedness does not mean mihtar- 
ism or an aggressive military spirit; it 
means simply the application to the mih- 
tary questions of the day of something 
of the experience and lessons of the past 
as well as those of the present. A man 
armed against thieves is not prone to 
become a thief unless he is one at heart. 
A nation can be strong without being 
immoral or a bully. Militarism, as indi- 
cated by the existence of a military class 

47 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

demanding and receiving special con- 
sideration and precedence and exercis- 
ing an undue influence in the internal 
affairs of the nation or upon its inter- 
national relations, is to be avoided beyond 
peradventure. But effective prepared- 
ness can be had without a trace of this 
condition, as illustrated by Switzerland 
and France — taking only representative 
forms of government as examples. 

The entire trend of our sentiment, 
past and present, disproves the possi- 
bility of such a condition of affairs. No 
class of the population is more opposed 
to the establishment of a condition of 
militarism than the army itself. The 
army is absolutely democratic, repre- 
senting, as it does, all classes of the 
people. The great danger which con- 
fronts our people is that which arises 
from an ignorance of the organization 

48 



THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE 

and capacity for the prompt use of 
highly organized force on the part of 
all the great nations except China and 
ourselves. While talking peace and arbi- 
tration we are, through wealth, commer- 
cial aggressiveness and heedlessness as 
to preparation to defend our rights and 
properties, one of the great menaces to 
peace. Lack of intelligent preparedness 
cannot promote peace; it can and does 
prejudice its continuance and will cer- 
tainly serve to prolong and make more 
deadly the effects of war. 

It is an insult to us as a people to 
assume that we cannot be strong and 
prepared to fight for the right without 
becoming likely to use our power for 
^vrong. This is the cant of weaklings 
who have no strong convictions of right 
for which they are willing to die, if 
need be. Let us drop cant and h^^^poc- 

49 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

risy and be sure that we can be both 
strong enough to protect our own rights 
and interests, and just and self- 
restrained enough, even though strong, 
to respect those of others. There is no 
real basis for assuming that if we pre- 
pare to resist aggression we are likely to 
become aggressors. 

We have no right to jeopardize all 
we have and hold most dear by failing 
to organize and prepare our strength 
because of the fear that if strong, organ- 
ized and ready, our nation may become 
an international highwayman. Rubbish 
and cant of the faint-hearted! Lacking 
the spirit which places principles and 
honor above fear and woimds! 

Peace treaties — international law — 
they should be observed, but they are 
not always. Where are those who trusted 
them and forgot that force is still 

50 



THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE 

to be reckoned with? The great Peace 
Palace stands empty in the land of a 
prosperous, industrious people at pres- 
ent under arms to protect their own 
neutrality. None of the causes of the 
greatest war of the ages has been or is 
being heard within its walls. Interna- 
tfonal law has been too often only the 
will of the strongest and may be again. 
It is at the best but a feeble staff to 
lean on, when issues involving the life 
of a nation, or nations, are involved. 

As Washington said: " The best way 
to make a good peace is to have a good 
army," — using the word "army" in 
the sense of military force, which includes 
the navy; and he might have said that 
the best way to preserve peace is to be 
prepared against war. We should favor 
preparedness not only on the grounds 
of safety, but on the grounds of human- 

51 



AMERICA S DUTY 

ity, for it is a brutal waste of life to 
send an undisciplined and untrained peo- 
ple into war, and war will come, from 
time to time, do what we may to try 
to avoid it. Xo nation does more to 
tempt others to war than one which, pos- 
sessing much of the trade and more 
than her proportion of the wealth of 
the world, fails to make adequate prepa- 
rations to Q'uard what she has. 



52 



ckaptkr hi 
Past Xat/oxaj. Poijcy 

"A government is the murderer of 
its citizens which sends them to the 
, field uninformed and untaught, where 
they are to meet men of the same age 
and strength mechanized by education 
and disciplined for battle." — General 
Richard Henry Jjee. 

We are a warlike, hut not a military 
}>er>ple; that is to say, we are quick to 
resent injury and ready to meet force 
with force, but we are not organized 
to employ force effectively. We are 
commercially aggressive; we are exceed- 
ingly rich. We never have submitted 
and are still indisposed to submit our- 
selves to discipline or preparation. We 
spend human life like water anri pay 

.53 



AMKHICA'S DUTY 

with blood and treasure for the lack 
of ordinary intelligent preparation. We 
are not so niiieh unready to resort to 
war for the right if need be as we are 
unprepared to wage it. We hate mili- 
tarism, object to large standing armies, 
and properly, and we can continue so 
to do and still make full preparation 
on lines not at variance with our ideals 
or the principles laid down by the 
founders. 

In our country peace societies are not 
a new idea. The New York Peace 
Society was founded in 1815, and as 
long ago as 1827 there were many peace 
societies in the United States. The effort 
has passed through many stages; the 
pacifists of to-day must not flatter them- 
selves that they have discovered that 
war is brutal. Cicero emphasized it in 
his day. Seneca characterized war as 

54 



IMST XATH)\AL VOIACY 

** plain insanity." If it wujrj be stopper! 
by pointing out that it is brutal and 
^ives pain, it would have beerj stopped 
jr>n^ ago. 

We must realize that there are two 
types of pr^aee. 'i'here is the peace of 
Jtorrje urjder Augustus, whieh was a 
real peace, and ito/ne and Korrjan citi- 
zens were respected by their rjeighbors; 
arid there is the other type, the peace oi' 
Jfonorius, in whose time pacifists prated 
as they do at present. Xonresistance 
was the theory. Kmperor Jfonorius 
raised poultry and the barbarians over- 
ran the empire. In the first instance 
there was peace with honor arjd dignity; 
in the second iastance the empire was 
overrun, a civilization almost destroyed 
through failure to listen to the teach- 
ings of Ijistory and make reasonable, 
rational preparation. It was the sort 

55 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

of peace which has existed in China. 
It was the kind of peace which marks 
the decadence of a nation. It goes hand 
in hand with the policy advocated by 
the peace-at-any-price people of to-day. 

Our early presidents were most of 
them truly great men, lovers of peace; 
some of them had participated in war, 
and all of them had lived through periods 
of war. They were just and upright 
in character. What was their advice 
to our people'' Washington says, in his 
first annual address: 

" To be prepared for war is one of 
tlie most effectual means of preserving 
peace. A free people ought not onl}' 
to be armed, but disciplined: to which 
end a uniform and well digested plan 
is requisite: and their safety and inter- 
est require that they should promote 
such manufactures as tend to render 

56 



PAST NATIONAL POLICY 

them independent of others for essential, 
particularly military, supplies." 

[fj his third arjnual message, s{>eaking 
of the rrjilitia, which under the provi- 
sions of the organic law included men 
from eighteen to forty-five, W^ashington 
said : 

•* 'JTjc safetv of the United States, 
under divine protection, ought to rest 
on the basis of systematic and solid 
arrangements, exposed as little as [k>s- 
sihle to the hazards of fortuitous cir- 
cumstances." 

In his fifth annual message he made 
this statement: 

** I cannot recomme/jd to your notice 
measures for the fulfillment of our duties 
to the rest of the world without again 
pressing upon you the necessity of plac- 
ing ourselves in a condition of complete 
defense and of extracting from them 

57 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

the fulfillment of their duties towards 
us. The United States ought not to 
indulge a persuasion that, contrary to 
the order of human events, they will for- 
ever keep at a distance those painful 
appeals to arms with which the history 
of every other nation abounds. There 
is a rank due to the United States among 
nations which will be withheld, if not 
absolutely lost, by the reputation of 
weakness. If we desire to avoid insult 
we must be able to repel it; if we desire 
to secure peace, one of the most power- 
ful instruments of our rising prosperity, 
it must be known that we are at all times 
ready for war." 

In Washington's eighth annual ad- 
dress, speaking of the country's inability 
to protect its commerce, he said: 

" Will it not then be advisable to 
begin without delay to provide and lay 

58 



PAST NATIONAL POLICY 

up materials for the building and equip- 
ping of ships of war and to proceed in 
the work by degrees in proportion as 
our resources shall render it practicable 
without inconvenience, so that a futiu'e 
war in Europe may not find our com- 
merce in the same unprotected state in 
wHich it was found during the present? " 

John Adams, in a special message, 
stated: " With a view and as a measure 
which even in time of universal peace 
ought not to be neglected, I recommend 
to your consideration a revision of the 
laws for organizing, arming and dis- 
ciplining the militia, to render that nat- 
ural and safe defense of the country 
efficacious." 

In his second annual message, which 
dealt with our relations with France, 
President Adams declared: "But in 
demonstrating by our conduct that we 

59 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

do not fear war in the necessary pro- 
tection of our rights and honor, we 
should give no room to infer that we 
abandon the desire of peace. An effi- 
cient preparation for war can alone 
secure peace. We ought, without loss 
of time, to lay the foundations for that 
increase of our navy to a size sufficient 
to guard our coasts and protect our 
trade." 

Thomas Jefferson, in his fifth annual 
message, advocated: " The organization 
of 300,000 able-bodied men between the 
ages of 18 and 26, for defense at any 
time or at any place where they may 
be wanted." 

In a letter to James Monroe, from 
Monticello, dated June 19, 1813, Jef- 
ferson wrote: 

" It proves more forcibly the neces- 
sity of obliging every citizen to be a 

60 



PAST NATIONAL POLICY 

soldier. This was the ease with the 
Greeks and Romans, and must be that 
of every free state. Where there is no 
oppression there will be no pauper hire- 
lings. We must train and classify the 
whole of our male citizens, and make 
military instruction a regular part of 
collegiate education. We can never be 
safe till this is done." 

This letter was written fourteen 
months before the fiasco at Bladensburg 
and the burning of Washington. Again 
he says: 

" If war be forced upon us in spite 
of our long and vain appeals to the jus- 
tice of nations, rapid and vigorous move- 
ment at the outset will go far toward 
securing us in its course and issue, and 
toward throwing its burdens on those 
who render necessary the resort from 
reason to force. 

61 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

" Considering the conditions of the 
times in which we hve, our attention 
should unremittingly be fixed on the 
safety of our country. For a people 
who are free and who mean to remain so, 
a well-organized and armed militia is 
their best security." 

One might continue almost indefinitely 
to quote from the messages and state 
papers of our presidents, concerning this 
great matter of defense, organization 
and readiness. 

General Henry Knox, when Secre- 
tary of War, sent to President Wash- 
ington, on January 18, 1790, a plan 
which provided for the enrolling, classi- 
fying and training of all able-bodied 
men from eighteen to sixty years of age. 
General Knox refers to the fact that 
this plan had been previously presented 
to Washington, had been modified some- 

62 



PAST NATIONAL POLICY 

what, and as now finally presented had 
Washington's approval. Among other 
things he states in his letter of trans- 
mission : 

" It had been my anxious desire to 
devise a national system of defense ade- 
quate to the probable exigencies of the 
United States, whether arising from 
internal or external causes; and at the 
same time to erect a standard of repub- 
lican magnanimity, independent of, and 
superior to, the powerful influence of 
wealth." 

Both Washington and Knox had had 
unfortunate experiences with the un- 
trained militia during the Revolution, 
and the plan they now proposed was not 
one which contemplated the use of militia 
as it was used during the Revolution, 
but it was, in effect, the forerunner of 
the idea voiced by Jefferson in 1813, 

63 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

namely, the organizing, classifying and 
training of the male population. Gen- 
eral Knox precedes his plan by a long 
introduction, much of which was appar- 
ently written by Washington. Among 
other statements therein made, worthy 
of note are the following: 

"But it is at the same time acknowl- 
edged that, unless a republic prepares 
itself by proper arrangements to meet 
those exigencies to which all states are in 
a degree liable, its peace and existence 
are more precarious than the forms of 
government in which the will of one 
directs the conduct of the whole, for 
the defense of the nation. 

"It is the intention of the present 
attempt to suggest the most efficient 
system of defense which may be com- 
patible with the interests of a free peo- 
ple — a system which will not only pro- 

64 



PAST NATIONAL POLICY 

duce the expected effect, but which, in 
its operations, shall also produce those 
habits and manners which will impart 
strength and durability to the whole 
government. 

" All discussions on the subject of a 
powerful militia will result in one or 
other of the following principles: 

'' First : Either efficient institutions 
must be established for the military edu- 
cation of the youth, and that the knowl- 
edge acquired therein shall be diffused 
throughout the community by the means 
of rotation; or, 

" Secondly: That the militia must be 
formed of substitutes, after the manner 
of the militia of Great Britain. 

" If the United States possesses the 
vigor of mind to establish the first insti- 
tution, it may be reasonably expected to 
produce the most unequivocal advan- 

65 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

tages. A glorious national spirit will be 
introduced, with its extensive train of 
political consequences. The youth will 
imbibe a love of their country; reverence 
and obedience to its laws; courage and 
elevation of mind; openness and liberal- 
ity of character, accompanied by a just 
spirit of honor; in addition to which their 
bodies will acquire robustness, greatly 
conducive to their personal happiness, 
as well as the defense of their country, 
while habit, with its silent but efficacious 
operations, will cement the system. 

" Every intelligent mind would rejoice 
in the establishment of an institution, 
under whose auspices the youth and vigor 
of the constitution would be renewed 
with each successive generation, and 
which would appear to secure the great 
principles of freedom and happiness 
against the injuries of time and events." 

66 



PAST NATIONAL POLICY 

General Knox then concludes his let- 
ter with the following summary: 

" First : That it is the indispensable 
duty of every nation to establish all nec- 
essary institutions for its own perfection 
and defense. 

" Secondly: That it is a capital secur- 
ity to a free state for the great body of 
the people to possess a competent knowl- 
edge of the military art. 

'* Thirdly: That this knowledge can- 
not be attained, in the present state of 
society, but by establishing adequate 
institutions for the military education of 
the youth; and that the knowledge 
acquired therein should be diffused 
throughout the community by the prin- 
ciples of rotation. 

"Fourthly: That every man of the 
proper age and ability of body, is firmly 
bound, by the special compact, to per- 

67 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

form personally his proportion of mili- 
tary duty for the defense of the state. 

'' Fifthly: That all men of the legal 
military age should be armed, enrolled 
and held responsible for different degrees 
of military service. 

"And, sixthly: That, agreeably to 
the Constitution, the United States are 
to provide for arming, organizing and 
disciplining the militia, and for govern- 
ing such a part of it as may be employed 
in the service of the United States, 
reserving to the states, respectively, the 
appointment of the officers and the 
authority of training the militia accord- 
ing to the discipline prescribed by Con- 
gress." 

This plan, briefly stated, consisted of 
the grouping of physically and mentally 
fit men, between the ages of eighteen 
and sixty years of age, into three corps. 

68 



PAST NATIONAL POLICY 

The young men between eighteen and 
twenty-one years of age formed the 
Advance Corps, and the men between 
twenty-one and forty-five formed the 
Main Corps. There was a third, or 
Reserve Corps, which consisted of men 
from forty-five to sixty years of age. 
The plan further provided that these 
first and second groups should be organ- 
ized into various military units; that 
the young men of eighteen and nineteen 
years of age should receive thirty days' 
training in camp each year; the men of 
twenty, ten days of training in camp 
each year; the men from twenty-one to 
forty-five, four days of training each 
year. 

This was a federal force and it was 
to be equipped, armed and subsisted at 
the expense of the United States; its 
members were required to take an oath 

69 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

of allegiance to the state and to the 
United States. Herein was an element 
of weakness. A force of this kind, or 
any kind of national force, should be 
purely a federal force. Its officers should 
be apointed by the president on the fed- 
eral authority and it should be available 
for service within or without the United 
States. The plan was a great advance 
over an}i:hing hitherto proposed, inas- 
much as it recognized the necessity for 
general military training. The training 
of these troops was to be prescribed by 
the United States. 

The early plan was a tremendous 
improvement over the militia idea finally 
adopted. It would have resulted in the 
general military training of our people 
and the dissemination of a knowledge of 
our military policy. It represented an 
appreciation of the necessity for mili- 

70 



PAST NATIONAL POLICY 

tary training. Had this system been 
adopted, the War of 1812 would prob- 
ably never have occurred. Or, if it had 
occurred, we should have been quickly 
successful in obtaining our objective. 
Both Washington and Knox recognized 
the economic efficiency which would be 
gained by this training, and they also 
realized that a tremendous improvement 
in citizenship would result. They did 
not expect the men from forty-five to 
sixty to serve in the first hue, but they 
saw that they would be a valuable asset 
on the lines of communication, depots, 
and other important fields of activity 
where the highest degree of physical 
excellence is not required. This pro- 
posed act, if it had been passed and put 
into effect, would have saved manv tens 
of thousands of lives and many hundreds 
of millions of money. 

71 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

If the advice of our early presidents 
was sound at the time it was given, 
when the ocean was a real barrier instead 
of, as at the present time, the readiest 
means of approach, once sea control is 
lost; when troops were moved over sea 
by sailing ships of relatively small capac- 
ity; when none of the great nations 
contained large, highly organized and 
equipped armies prepared for prompt 
movement in any direction; when the 
arms of war were simple and easy of 
manufacture and easy to acquire famil- 
iarity with; when we had little in the 
way of commerce or wealth to tempt 
aggression; how much more sound is it 
now, when all great nations have highly 
organized armies, large reserves of men 
and material, adequate equipment of all 
kinds ? 

Since then steam has divided time 

72 



PAST NATIONAL POLICY 

and distance by ten; the arms of war 
are most intricate and require a long 
time to manufacture, and it takes a still 
longer time to teach men to use them 
effectively; our wealth has enormously 
increased; our commerce spreads over the 
earth and we hold great areas far beyond 
our continental limits; our people are 
unskilled in the use of arms, and our 
population as a whole has little appre- 
ciation of its military obligation. There 
is no question but that the advice of 
our early presidents is entitled to much 
more attention to-day than when given. 
This country has never engaged single- 
handed in a war with a nation of the 
first class prepared for war. We have 
absolutely no conception of what modern 
war means when conducted by a nation 
organized and ready in men and mate- 
rial. It is to be hoped that we may 

73 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

never have this experience, certainly not 
until we have learned something fmm 
the experience of others, something from 
the lessons of the past as well as those 
of the present. 

We have no markedly superior mili- 
tary virtues; as a people, the blood of 
all peoples runs in our veins. We live 
under a form of government which tends 
to develop individuality and self-confi- 
dence, good qualities if coordinated and 
harmonized by discipline. But there is 
nothing which indicates peculiar or supe- 
rior military excellence, and there is noth- 
ing in our military history upon which 
we can found such an assumption. We 
have splendid material for soldiers, if 
trained, but without training that mate- 
rial is relatively of little value. 

There seems to be a general impres- 
sion that, having blundered through our 

74 



PAST NATIONAL POLICY 

past wars with a hideously unnecessary 
expenditure of Hfe and treasure, some- 
how or other we shall continue to blunder 
on successfully, regardless of lack of 
preparation on our part or of thorough 
organization and preparation on the paii: 
of our possible antagonist. Such an 
opinion is entirely unwarranted. 
Thorough preparation is absolutely indis- 
pensable. 

General Harry Lee — popularly known 
as " Light-Horse Harry " — stated at 
the end of the Revolution that the nation 
was the murderer of its men which sent 
them untrained and undisciplined to meet 
equally good men, mechanized and dis- 
ciplined by training. These words were 
true when they were uttered and they 
are true to-day, and they apply with 
peculiar force to our own people. It is 
not enough to be willing — we must be 

75 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

prepared. One would not think of put- 
ting into a lifeboat men who could neither 
row nor swim; and yet we assume to 
send them into battle undisciplined and 
untrained, unfamiliar with the use of 
arms, where they are to meet men trained 
to the minute. It is murder — nothing 
else. 

If a lot of men physically of the 
right type presented themselves for the 
crews or for the teams of a university 
and said they were willing to go into 
athletics, but would not train, they would 
receive scant courtesy at the hands of 
their college mates. Experience in ath- 
letics has taught that success is abso- 
lutely dependent upon thorough prepa- 
ration; and the would-be athlete who 
assumed that he could meet, with any 
hope of success, an equally good man, 
physically fit and trained in all the 

76 



PAST NATIONAL POLICY 

details of the game, would be looked 
upon as little better than a fool. 

So it is with professional soldiers, who 
have devoted their lives to their work: 
they see the folly of the idle declarations 
of the Fourth of July orator, or the 
equally fatuous and misleading state- 
ments of the men who say that we, by 
virtue of peculiar qualities, are superior 
to equally good men, trained and ready. 
Such vain boasts are more than foolish 

— they are dangerous. They strike at 
the very life of the nation. If we heed 
them longer we shall repent in sackcloth 
and ashes. 

While students of military policy and 
our professional soldiers of the best type 

— not the machine-cut-and-dried type, 
but the soldiers with learning and imag- 
ination — have always recognized that 
campaigns are won in the preparations 

77 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

for them, our people have never appre- 
ciated this great truth, nor do they real- 
ize that thorough organization of the 
nation's resources in men, material and 
money is necessary to a success which 
shall be characterized by the minimimi 
loss of blood and treasure. Battles are 
won as well as lost in the national legis- 
lature, in the offices of the administra- 
tion, in departments, as well as in the 
field. Failure to provide means for con- 
ducting the war, neglect properly to 
organize, undue interference by non- 
technical persons in the direction of that 
highly specialized and technical business, 
war, the direction of operations to meet 
political demands of the hour, all con- 
tribute, with fateful force, to the out- 
come of the armed struggle. 

Under our procedure in the past, the 
soldier too often has had little to say 

78 



"x; 



PAST NATIONAL POLICY 

in the great question of preparation in 
its varied forms, involving organization, 
supply and equipment, and only too 
often has found himself like a sailor put 
on board a ship in a gale of wind — a 
ship built not by professional shipbuild- 
ers — a ship of whose equipment and 
personnel he is largely ignorant. All 
he can do is to make the best of a bad 
situation, reorganize and re-equip in the 
face of a storm. So it has been only 
too often with our soldiers, called to lead 
badly organized, uninstructed, half- 
armed bodies of troops without previous 
training. This describes, in a general 
way, the situation which has existed at 
the beginning of our wars in the past. 
These conditions should not be possible 
in future wars; but they will be unless 
we study thoroughly the question in all 
its aspects, and take wise measures of 

79 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

precaution and make such preparation 
as the experience of the past and the 
best information of the present indicate. 

When our people offer their bodies 
and their lives to the nation for service 
in war in the nation's defense, they have 
a right to demand that these sacrifices 
shall be made — if made they must be 
— under conditions which minimize the 
probability of disaster from lack of prep- 
aration, instruction, arms, equipment or 
organization, both on the fighting line 
and behind it. 

Preparation will tend to make the 
struggle as brief as possible, and reduce 
the cost in life and treasure to the low- 
est possible limit. Our people have never 
entered into war with any of these assur- 
ances. They have gone into it blindly, 
uninformed as to the necessity of the 
hundred and one things which make for 

80 



PAST NATIONAL POLICY 

preparation and which are the sure 
foundations of success. National defense 
begins with the people, and must find 
its main support among their represen- 
tatives, for, as John Adams said, 
" National defense is one of the cardinal 
duties of a statesman; the soldier can 
only endorse when asked; the statesman 
must advocate, and the legislative body 
enact." 

Only too often do we find men who 
should know better, speaking of our 
great military resources, forgetting that 
unless developed and organized they will 
be of no more value in the quick onrush 
of modern war, initiated by a prepared 
nation, than would an undeveloped gold 
mine in Alaska be in a crisis in Wall 
Street. The fact that a nation has 
resources does not help if those resources 
are undeveloped and unavailable. If 

81 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

modern war emphasizes any one thing 
above another, it is that resources of all 
kinds must be promptly available and 
organized. Mere numbers, untrained, 
unorganized and unequipped, mean lit- 
tle; no wolf was ever frightened by 
the size of a flock of sheep. 

As one considers the conduct of our 
various wars from the standpoint of 
military efficiency and economy in life 
and treasure, there is but one conclusion 
possible, and that is that our lack of 
system has been not only unduly expen- 
sive from every standpoint but that it 
has led to great prolongation of war, 
unnecessary loss of life and treasure, and 
consequent interference with the develop- 
ment of the country. In some instances 
that lack of organization has resulted in 
failure to attain the object sought. 

In the Revolutionary War, Washing- 

82 



PAST NATIONAL POLICY 

ton stands out conspicuouslj^ as the great 
coordinating, dominant figure, and the 
more one studies the conduct of that 
war the more he is impressed by the debt 
we owe to Washington. His sound 
judgment, able military leadership, and, 
above all, his patience and persistence, 
coupled with infinite tact, made it pos- 
sible for him to retain the confidence 
of Congress and the people to an unusual 
extent and to hold together the poorly 
equipped and hastily assembled raw 
levies which formed the bulk of the 
K evolutionary armies. 



83 



chapter iv 
Lessons of the Revolution 

"Against stupidity the very gods 
themselves contend in vain." — Schil- 
ler, 

The causes leading to the Revolution 
had produced such effect that, as early 
as 1774, several of the Colonies began 
preparations for war with England, and 
a Provisional Congress was convened in 
Massachusetts, with John Hancock as 
president. This Congress appointed offi- 
cers and adopted organization for the 
militia and made certain arrangements 
for the collections of supplies, equipment 
and provisions. The royal governor of 
the colony attempted to prevent the 

84 



THE REVOLUTION 

assembly of this Congress, but was unsuc- 
cessful. 

In the following year a second Con- 
gress assembled and appointed a Com- 
mittee of Safety, with authority to raise 
and support a military force to resist the 
Acts of Paarliament. Under this author- 
ity a considerable force of militia was 
raised, part of it called Minute Men, 
or troops bound to hold themselves in 
readiness for instant service. This was 
the condition of aiFairs when the con- 
flicts occurred at Lexington and Con- 
cord. A few^ days later, April 22nd, 
steps Avere taken formally to organize 
for defense against Great Britain. The 
Congress decided to raise an army of 
30,000 men, and immediately to enroll 
13,600 men within the limits of Massa- 
chusetts, trusting that the balance might 
be supplied by New Hampshire, Rhode 

85 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

Island and Connecticut. Troops were 
raised by giving to anyone who succeeded 
in enrolling fifty-nine men, a captain's 
commission, and a colonel's commission 
to any man who could secure ten such 
companies. In other words, qualifica- 
tions for command rested solely on the 
ability to enroll men. 

It is not difficult to foresee the results 
which must necessarily follow under a 
system based upon such a policy. The 
training of the officers and their qual- 
ifications for command meant little. Of 
course we must not forget that the situa- 
tion was an extremely difficult one. The 
troops had to be raised, there were rela- 
tively few trained officers in the colony, 
and many who had had previous military 
experience remained constant in their 
allegiance to Great Britain. Still there 
is no doubt that a larger proportion of 

86 



THE REVOLUTION 

trained officers could have been secured 
had the matter of organization been more 
systematically undertaken. The men 
were courageous, and when led by offi- 
cers of experience and capacity, fighting 
in a defensive position, and not required 
to maneuver in the face of an enemy, 
rendered brave and good service, as at 
Bunker Hill. The Continental Army, 
when Washington assumed command, 
consisted of a mass of raw levies, gen- 
erally speaking, under incompetent offi- 
cers — levies composed of men who had 
no idea of remaining throughout the war 
and undergoing thorough training. 

There were many things outside the 
condition of the army itself which led 
to great embarrassment. The action at 
Lexington took place three weeks before 
the assembling of the Second Conti- 
nental Congress, and compelled that 

8T 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

body to assume immediately the func- 
tions of civil government, but as it had 
no authority to levy taxes or provide a 
revenue, it could only issue Bills of 
Credit. The power to create and sup- 
port armies was crippled by a financial 
system which was based wholly upon the 
faith of the people in ultunate success. 
If the Congress had had the power to 
levy taxes and raise a revenue, the war 
would have been much shorter and its 
conduct more vigorous. Moreover, the 
Congress was vested with both executive 
and legislative power and there was con- 
sequently a lack of the balance and 
adjustment which exists where these 
functions are distinct and separate. The 
country was dependent for its military 
legislation upon the decisions of a group 
of citizens wholly without instruction in 
military matters, and influenced by gen- 

88 



THE REVOLUTION 

eral fear of a standing army. Washing- 
ton's correspondence indicates very 
clearly the embarrassments and the diffi- 
culties of the situation. 

The strength of the armj'- at the time 
of Washington's assignment to command 
was about 17,000 men, all of them under 
sfiort enlistment. Much had to be accom- 
plished. It was absolutely essential to 
organize a force which would owe its 
allegiance to the United Colonies, and 
in June, with this end in view. Congress 
authorized the raising of ten companies 
of riflemen in Pennsylvania, Maryland 
and Virginia, with a term of enlistment 
of one year. This was the nucleus of 
the army which finally achieved American 
independence. During the year both 
infantry and artillery were added. The 
enlistments were stiU for a short period, 
and did not extend beyond the end of 

89 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

the fallowing vear. The terms of enlist- 
merit of the troops thereby enrolled 
mostly expired at or near the end of 
177 o. As it was necessary promptly to 
raise troops to replace them and to add 
to those already enrolled, Congress 
decided to raise twenty-six regiments: 
sixteen in JMassachusetts, five in Con- 
necticut, two in Rhode Island, and tliree 
in New Hampshire. Washington was 
authorized to appoint the officers. This 
resulted in a condition to which Wash- 
ington refers in various letters. 

On November 11, 1775, he writes as 
follows : 

" The trouble I have in the arrange- 
ment of the army is really inconceivable. 
Many of the officers sent in their names 
to serve in expectation of promotion; 
others stood aloof to see what advantage 
they could make for themselves, while a 

90 



THE REVOLUTION 

number, who have declined, have again 
sent in their names to serve. So great 
has the confusion arising from these 
and many other perplexing circumstances 
been that I found it absolutely impos- 
sible to fix this very interesting busi- 
ness exactly on the plan resolved on in 
the conference, though I have kept up 
to the spirit of it as near as the nature 
and necessity of the case would permit. 
" The difficulty with the soldiers is 
as great, indeed, more so, if possible, 
than with the officers. They will not 
enlist until they know their colonel, lieu- 
tenant-colonel, major, and captain, so 
that it was necessary to fix the officers 
the first thing, which is, at last, in some 
manner done, and I have given out 
enlisting orders." 

And on November 28th he continues: 
" The number enlisted since my last 

91 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

is two thousand five hundred and forty 
men. I am sorry to be necessitated to 
mention to you the egregious want of 
pubhe spirit which reigns here. Instead 
of pressing to be engaged in the cause 
of their country, which I vainly flat- 
tered myself would be the case, I find 
we are likely to be deserted in a most 
critical time. Those that have enlisted 
must have a furlough, which I have been 
obliged to grant to fifty at a time, from 
each regiment. The Connecticut troops, 
upon whom I reckoned, are as backward, 
indeed, if possible, more so than the 
people of this colony. Our situation is 
truly alarming, and of this General 
Howe is well apprised, it being the com- 
mon topic of conversation when the peo- 
ple left Boston last Friday. No doubt 
when he is reinforced he will avail him- 
self of the information." 

92 



THE REVOLUTION 

And in a private letter a little later, 
he describes conditions in the following 
words : 

" Such a dearth of public spirit and 
such want of virtue, such stock- jobbing 
and fertility in all the low arts to obtain 
advantages of one kind or another in this 
great change of military arrangement 
I never saw before, and pray God's 
mercy that I may never be witness to 
again. What will be the end of these 
maneuvers is beyond my scan. I trem- 
ble at the prospect. We have been till 
this time enlisting about three thousand 
five hundred men. To engage these I 
have been obliged to allow furloughs as 
far as fifty men to a regiment, and the 
officers, I am persuaded, indulge as many 
more. The Connecticut troops will not 
be prevailed upon to stay longer than 
their term, saving those who have enlisted 

93 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

for the next campaign, and are mostly 
on furlough; and such a mercenary spirit 
pervades the whole that I should not 
be at all surprised at any disaster that 
may happen. In short, after the last 
of this month our lines will be so weak- 
ened that the Minute Men and militia 
must be called in for their defense, and 
these being under no kind of govern- 
ment themselves, will destroy the little 
subordination I have been laboring to 
establish, and run me into one evil while 
I am endeavoring to avoid another; but 
the lesser must be chosen." 

These letters point out very plainly 
the conditions w^hich existed. Another 
important thing to remember is that 
these occurrences took place during a 
period when our forefathers were strug- 
gling for independence, when, as we were 
taught in school, a spirit of patriotism 

94 



THE REVOLUTION 

and self-sacrifice stirred the country. 
The foregoing extracts from Washing- 
ton's letters show the real situation. It 
was extremely difficult to secure troops 
for the armed forces. Men came only 
for short periods of time, and insisted 
upon the election of their officers. Dis- 
cipline was poor, and such as there was, 
was difficult of enforcement. In fact, 
the situation was more or less one of 
military chaos, and it was only Wash- 
ington's remarkable personality that 
made it possible to hold together these 
discordant elements in the form of a 
fighting force. 

We soon went to the bounty, small 
at first, but gradually increased. In 
1778 freedom was offered by Rhode 
Island to negroes if they would enlist. 
The difficulty in increasing the Conti- 
nental forces augmented instead of dimin- 

95 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

ished from year to year. Washington 
was twice empowered with dictatorial 
|)owers. The colonial assemblies singly 
and collectively made special efforts to 
secure troops but there seems to have 
been lacking a sense of individual respon- 
sibility for soldier service and the result 
was that our greatest force was in 1776, 
when we had S9,()()() troops, 47,000 Con- 
tinentals, 42.000 militia. The Continen- 
tals were really short service troops. 
From this year on the strength of the 
American force steadily decreased until, 
in 1781, the force was only a trifle over 
29,400 men. At no time during the war 
did AVashington have an effective force 
of 20,000 men in line, notwithstanding 
the fact that nearly 400,000 men were 
enrolled during the war. 

One of the principal causes of ditti- 
culty during the war was that control 

96 



THE REVOLUTION 

of military matters rested with the Con- 
tinental Congress, and that hody was 
jealous of a standing army, knew little 
of military matters, and was inclined 
to make economies which resulted in vast 
expenditures through extending the war 
and rendering unavailing such expendi- 
tures as had previously heen made. 
Washington did everything a man could 
do in his position, and he accomplished 
miracles. We were fortunate in this 
war in receiving at a critical time the 
invaluahle assistance of France, and from 
the further fact that the contention of 
the Colonies was supported hy a strong 
party in England. The difficulties which 
Washington encountered can hest be 
appreciated by soldiers who realize what 
it means to make new armies practically 
every year. Large forces of militia were 
called in from time to time but they 

97 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

were almost useless. Washington's opin- 
ion of men raised in this manner with- 
out training and without discipline, was 
expressed as follows: 

'* To place any dependence upon mili- 
tia is assuredly resting upon a broken 
staff. Men just dragged from the ten- 
der scenes of domestic life, unaccustomed 
to the din of arms, totally unacquainted 
with every kind of military skill (which 
is followed by want of confidence in 
themselves when opposed by troops regu- 
larly trained, disciplined, and appointed, 
superior in knowledge and superior in 
arms) are timid and ready to fly from 
their own shadows. 

*' Relaxed and unfit as our rules and 
regulations of war are for the govern- 
ment of an army, the militia (these prop- 
erly so called, for of these we have two 
sorts, the six-months men and those sent 

98 



THE REVOLUTION 

ill as a temporary aid) do not think 
themselves subject to them, and there- 
fore take hberties which the soldier is 
punished for. This creates jealousy, 
jealousy begets dissatisfaction, and this 
by degrees ripens into mutiny, keeping 
the whole army in a confused and dis- 
ordered state, rendering the time of those 
who wish to see regularity and good 
order prevail more unhappy than words 
can describe. Besides this, such repeated 
changes take place that all arrangement 
is set at naught and the constant fluctua- 
tion of things deranges every plan as 
fast as it is adopted. 

" Those, sir, Congress may be assured, 
are but a small part of the inconven- 
iences which might be enumerated and 
attributed to militia, but there is one 
that merits particular attention, and that 
is the expense. Certain I am that it 

99 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

would be cheaper to keep 50,000 or 
100,000 in constant pay than to depend 
upon half the number and supply the 
other half occasionally by militia. The 
time the latter are in pay before and 
after they are in camp, assembling and 
marching, the waste of ammunition, the 
consumption of stores, which in spite of 
every resolution or requisition of Con- 
gress, they must be furnished with or 
sent home, added to other incidental 
expenses consequent upon their coming 
and conduct in camp, surpass all idea 
and destroy every kind of regularity and 
economy which you could establish among 
fixed and settled troops, and will, in 
my opinion prove, if the scheme is 
adhered to, the ruin of our cause." 

During the war various reorganiza- 
tions took place; the conditions were 
somewhat improved through the gradual 

100 



THE REVOLUTION 

acquirement of a small nucleus of trained 
officers; but the old vicious conditions 
concerning the method of raising men, 
short terms of enlistments, rather than 
enlistments for the war, bounties, deser- 
tions, continued. Bounties grew from 
small sums to sums Avhich, in those days, 
were small fortunes and the foundation 
was laid for a procedure which was most 
vicious and tended to corrupt the patriot- 
ism of the nation: namely, the bounty 
system, or the buying of men to dis- 
charge their military obligations to the 
nation. 

Washington's opinion of our military 
policy is found in a letter to the presi- 
dent of Congress, August 20, 1780: 

" Had we formed a permanent army 
in the beginning, which, by the con- 
tinuance of the same men in service, had 
been capable of discipline, we never 

101 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

should have had to retreat with a hand- 
ful of men across the Delaware in 1770, 
trembling for the fate of America, which 
nothing but the infatuation of the enemy 
could have saved; we should not have 
remained all the succeeding winter at 
their mercy, with sometimes scarcely a 
sufficient body of men to mount the 
ordinary guards, liable at every moment 
to be dissipated, if they had only thought 
proper to march against us; we should 
not have been under the necessity of 
fighting Brandy wine, with an unequal 
nimiber of raw troops, and afterwards 
of seeing Philadelphia fall a prey to a 
victorious army; we should not have been 
at Valley Forge with less than half 
the force of the enemy, destitute of 
everything, in a situation neither to resist 
nor to retire; we should not have seen 
New York left with a handful of men, 

102 



THE REVOLUTION 

yet an overmatch for the main army of 
these States, while the principal part of 
their force was detached for the reduc- 
tion of two of them; we should not have 
found ourselves this spring so weak as 
to be insulted by 5,000 men, unable to 
protect our baggage and magazines, 
tlfeir security depending on a good coun- 
tenance and a want of enterprise in 
the enemy; we should not have been the 
greatest part of the war inferior to the 
enemy, indebted for our safety to their 
inactivity, enduring frequently the morti- 
fication of seeing inviting opportunities 
to ruin them pass unimproved for want 
of a force which the country was com- 
pletely able to afford, and of seeing 
the country ravaged, our towns burnt, 
the inhabitants plundered, abused, mur- 
dered, with impunity from the same 
cause. 

103 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

*' Nor have the ill effects been con- 
liiied to the mihtarv hue. A great part 
of the einbarrassineiits in the civil depart- 
ments flow from the same source. The 
deranijement of our finances is essentially 
to be ascribed to it. The expenses of 
the war and the paper emissions have 
been greatly multiplied by it. We have 
had a great part of the time two sets 
of men to feed and pay — the discharged 
men going liome and tlie levies coming 
in. This ^\as more remarkably the case 
in 1775 and 1776. The difficulty and 
cost of engaging men have increased at 
every successive attempt, till among the 
present lines we find there are some who 
have received $1,50 in specie for five 
months' service, while our ofHcers are 
reduced to the disagreeable necessity 
of performing the duties of drill ser- 
geants t(^ them, with this mortifying 

104 



THE REVOLUTION 

reflection annexed to the business, that 
by the time they have taught these men 
the rudiments of a soldier's duty their 
services will have expired and the work 
i-ecommenced with a new set. The con- 
sumption of provisions, arms, accouter- 
ments, and stores of every kind has 
been doubled in spite of every precau- 
tion I could use, not only from the cause 
just mentioned, but from the careless- 
ness and licentiousness incident to militia 
and irregular troops. Our discipline also 
has been much hurt, if not ruined, by 
such constant changes. The frequent 
calls upon the mihtia have interrupted 
the cultivation of the land, and of course 
have lessened the quantity of its produce, 
occasioned a scarcity, and enhanced the 
prices. In an army so unstable as ours 
order and economy have been imprac- 
ticable. No person who has been a close 

105 



AMERICA S DUTY 

observer of the progress of our aifairs 
can doubt that our currency has depre- 
ciated without comparison more rapidly 
from the system of short enlistments 
than it would have done otherwise. 

" There is every reason to believe that 
the war has been protracted on this 
account. Our opposition being less, the 
successes of the enemy have been greater. 
The fluctuation of the army kept alive 
their hopes, and at every period of the 
dissolution of a considerable part of it 
they have flattered themselves with some 
decisive advantages. Had we kept a 
permanent army on foot the enemy could 
have had nothing to hope for, and would 
in all probability have listened to terms 
long since." 

There is no reason to believe that the 
Washington opinions, as expressed, 
underwent anv essential change. War 

106 



THE REVOLUTIOX 

drew its weary length along, with con- 
stantly changing personnel and small 
and ineffective commands. The year 
of 1781 was marked by a mutiny of 
troops of the Pennsylvania line. Our 
regular officers had become skilled and 
able and were making the best possible 
use of the inferior troops furnished them. 
Following the junction of the French 
and American troops came the operations 
against Yorktown and the capture of 
Cornwallis. This was the last battle of 
the Revohjtion. The United States had 
employed during the war 395,858 troops. 
Their forces were strongest in 1776. 
The British forces at the outbreak of 
the war numbered 20,121, while at the 
end they amounted to 42,075. The mili- 
tary events which had a strong bearing 
upon the expulsion of the British were, 
first, the capture of Burgoyne, and, sec- 

107 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

ondly, that of Cornwallis, an event which 
was made possible only by the strong 
cooperation of the French forces on sea 
and land. The prosecution of the war 
by the British had not been at any time 
especially vigorous. 

The lack of centralized power was 
felt throughout the Revolution, and we 
have the curious picture of an alliance 
of states engaged in war viewing with 
suspicion a standing army, and yet on 
two occasions forced to give to the com- 
mander of these forces dictatorial power. 
Embarrassing complications occurred 
from the tendency to the exercise of 
power by the states. The}^ assumed at 
critical moments a quasi-independent atti- 
tude, as illustrated by the action of Gov- 
ernor Thomas Jefferson in detaining the 
Virginia militia for home defense when 
it was urgently required by General 

108 



THE REVOLUTION 

Greene; and by the action of the people 
of Boston in fitting out (without con- 
sulting the commander-in-chief) an inde- 
pendent military expedition for opera- 
tion against the British in Maine. 

In April, 1812, the governor of Mas- 
sachusetts denied the right of Congress 
or the president to determine when con- 
ditions justified the calling out of the 
militia, and claimed that this right is 
vested in the commanders-in-chief of mili- 
tia of the various states — in other words, 
in the governors. At the same time 
Connecticut made substantially the same 
claim. 

A little later in the same year, Ver- 
mont declared that the military strength 
and resources of the state must be 
reserved for its own defense and protec- 
tion exclusively, and in the following year 
the same state refused to permit the mili- 

109 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

tia to go to General Macomb's support. 
In fact, the whole structure was loosely 
jointed and could not have resisted a 
strong and well-organized attack. 

Taking it as a whole, however, and 
considering the lack of centralized power, 
ignorance of the legislative and execu- 
tive body in all matters military, the 
depreciation of currency, and that con- 
sciousness which must have existed among 
the troops of a lack of strong govern- 
ment, there was less trouble than might 
have been expected. JNIutiny — although 
causes for it in the way of shortage of 
pay and clothing often existed — seldom 
ocurred. The record of the Continen- 
tal troops, one might say " the regular 
troops," was remarkably good. We had 
the material for both officers and men, 
but we lacked a strong government, 
organization and system. In other 

110 



THE REVOLUTION 

words, there was a weak military policy 
and no appreciation of the nriilitary needs 
of the country, if the war was to have 
beer J conducted vigorously and with the 
rnininiurn loss of life and expenditure 
of treasure. 

During the revolutionary war the 
stales formed a very loose confederacy, 
lacking most of the elements of strength 
which come from national resources prop- 
erly mobilized and directed by a central 
authority. The Continental Congress 
exercised only a limited measure of con- 
trol and toward the end of the war it 
was, to a large extent, advisory. Con- 
gress lacked the power to utilize and 
make available the country's military 
resources. The result was that at no 
time during the revolution was the full 
strength of the new-born nation brought 
to bear, and not only was there lack of 

111 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

a strong coordinating authority, but the 
whole military system was fatally defec- 
tive. It represented the folly of depend- 
ing upon troops enlisted for short 
periods, untrained, poorly organized, 
with a constantly changing enlisted per- 
sonnel. The unnecessary sacrifice of life 
and expenditure of treasure incident to 
this system and adherence to it, has fol- 
lowed through all our wars, as the table 
on the following page indicates. 

As a result of this pernicious system 
of frequent and short enlistments, fol- 
lowed naturally a pension system involv- 
ing tremendous expense, only a small 
portion of which would have been nec- 
essary had we had a sound military 
policy. 

The policy of short enlistments, of 
enrolling men hastily, not only cost us 
unnecessarily in life and treasure, but 

112 



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AINIERICA'S DUTY 

at times exercised a dangerous influence 
upon military operations. Arnold was 
forced to deliver an assault upon Quebec 
because of the approaching expiration 
of the enlistments of a large portion of 
his troops. Montgomery was killed, 
Arnold wounded, and a large part of 
the force killed, wounded, or taken 
prisoners. 

AVashington repeatedly refers to the 
loss of troops and constant change of 
personnel incident to this system of short 
enlistments. 

Brietlv, these are the lessons of the 
Mar: That a confederation of states, 
without a strong central government 
under the direction of citizens without 
experience in military matters and under 
conditions which permit each state to 
raise, arm and equip troops, is an exceed- 
ingly weak form of government for the 

114 



THE REVOLUTION 

prosecution of war ; that the war resources 
of a nation can only be employed to 
the greatest advantage when used as a 
national force under national control and 
direction; that undisciplined and raw lev- 
ies cannot meet disciplined troops with 
any hope of success; that voluntary 
enlistments based on patriotism and the 
bounty cannot be relied upon to supply 
men for the army during a prolonged 
war, but that men should be enlisted for 
the period of the war; and, finally, that 
we should turn to the policy of general 
military training with a fixed period of 
obligation for all able-bodied men. 

It is only by such a system that we 
shall be able quickly, smoothly and 
effectually to mobihze our forces for 
war. Great changes have occurred in 
the organization, equipment and pre- 
paredness of our possible antagonists, 

115 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

and whatever system we have must be 
one which permits prompt mobilization 
of trained men. It must be one which 
enables us to know with certainty and 
exactness what our resources in men are, 
just when they will be available, and 
what their qualifications are. This is 
not possible under either a volunteer sys- 
tem or under a system of draft, initiated 
after war has commenced. 



116 



chapter v 
Seventy Years of Inefficiency 

"It is better to be ready for war 
and not have it than to have vrar and 
• not be ready for it." — L. W. 

The close of the Revolutionary War 
found the young nation confronted with 
many grave questions, among them the 
question of a proper military establish- 
ment. This was an object of special 
solicitation on the part of Washington, 
and he recommended in strong language 
the thorough training of the militia, their 
proper arming and equipment. By mili- 
tia he meant the militia which includes 
all men from eighteen to forty-five years 
of age. The Continental Army was 
disbanded, excepting one battery of artil- 

117 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

lery known as the Alexander Hamilton 
Battery, a battery which still exists in 
our service. Although the finances of 
the nation were exhausted, an attempt 
was made to establish a small regular 
establishment, a mixed regiment of 
infantry and artillery, ridiculously inade- 
quate, of course. Later that regiment 
was expanded a little into a Legionary 
Corps consisting of some 2,040 non- 
commissioned officers and privates. 

Feeble, half-hearted measures in the 
direction of an organization of a small 
military force followed during the next 
few years. In 1789 the War Depart- 
ment was organized. In 1790 there was 
another reorganization of the army. This 
organization fixed the standard at 1,216 
noncommissioned officers and privates — 
not a formidable force. Various Indian 
campaigns indicated the necessity of a 

118 



YEARS OF INEFFICIENCY 

stronger military establishment, and in 
1791 there was a further reorganization 
which resulted in the addition of another 
regiment. Two general officers were 
authorized. 

St. Clair's defeat emphasized the neces- 
sity of a still further increase in mili- 
tary establishment, as well as the inad- 
visability of depending upon untrained 
militia. This reorganization resulted in 
the filling up of the then existing mili- 
tary establishment to full strength and 
the addition of three regiments of infan- 
try and certain minor additions in field 
and staff officers. About this time the 
legionary idea, which originated with 
Baron von Steuben, was applied to the 
organization of the regular army, and 
was proposed for the militia. The 
Legion was really a small, complete army 
in itself, a complete fighting unit, com- 

119 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

posed of the different arms. General 
Knox, then secretary of war, strongly 
approved the idea for the army, and 
recommended its extension to include all 
phj^sically and mentally fit men from 
eighteen to sixty years of age, with the 
idea of building up a trained citizen 
soldiery. 

The legionary organization for the reg- 
ular establishment was adopted, although 
unfortunately the general plan proposed 
by General Knox, to divide and class- 
ify the entire male population between 
eighteen and sixty, was not adopted. In 
1795-7 there was further reorganization, 
made necessary by increasing calls for 
troops in connection with Indian dis- 
turbances and the Whiskey Rebellion in 
Pennsylvania in August, 1794. In 1798 
the president was authorized to organize 
a provisional army in case of the exist- 

120 



YEARS OF INEFFICIENCY 

ence of war or an invasion of our ter- 
ritory, or imminent danger. This Pro- 
vincial Army was to consist of 10,000 
noncommissioned officers and men, to be 
enlisted for a period of three years. The 
force was to be officered by the presi- 
dent. Washington was appointed com- 
mander-in-chief, with the rank of lieu- 
tenant-general. This army was never 
called into being. Farther reorganiza- 
tion in 1802 resulted in a further reduc- 
tion in the strength of the army. In the 
same year a real step forward was taken 
through the establishment of the Mili- 
tary Academy at West Point. Alex- 
ander Hamilton was the moving force 
behind the establishment of this splen- 
did institution. Washington strongly 
approved, and three days before his death 
he wrote as follows to Hamilton: 
" The establishment of an institution 

121 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

of this kind on a respectable and exten- 
sive basis has ever been considered by 
Hie an object of primary importance to 
this countrv, and while I was in the chair 
of government I omitted no proper 
opportunity of recommending it in my 
public speeches and otherwise to the 
attention of the Legislature." 

McHenry, the Secretary of War, 
urged the establishment of the Acad- 
emy in the following words: 

" It cannot be forgotten that in our 
Revolutionary War it was not till after 
several years' practice in arms, and the 
extension of the periods for which our 
soldiers were at first enlisted, that we 
found them at all qualified to meet on 
the field of battle those to whom they 
were opposed. The occasional brilliant 
and justly celebrated acts of some of our 
militia during that eventful period detract 

122 



yp:ars of inefficiency 

nothing from this dear-bought truth. 

" The great man who conducted the 
war of our Revolution was continually 
compelled to conform his conduct to the 
circumstances growing out of the experi- 
mental lessons just mentioned. What 
w^ the secret of his conduct? Must it 
be told? It may, and without exciting a 
blush or an uneasy sensation in any of 
his surviving companies in arms. He 
had an army of men, but he had few 
officers or soldiers in that army." 

The Academy provided for a force 
of only twenty officers and cadets, and 
its purpose was to provide a corps of 
engineers. Since the day of its founda- 
tion it has been the strong prop of our 
military establishment. 

There were further sporadic changes 
in the composition of the army, and in 
1808 it was increased by some five regi- 

123 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

merits of infantry, a regiment of rifle- 
men, a regiment of light artillery, and 
one regiment of light dragoons, enlisted 
for a period of five years. This was the 
result, principally, of the increasing prob- 
ability of war with Great Britain. In 
March, 1812, an attempt was made to 
organize a Quartermaster's Department, 
Commissary Department, Ordnance De- 
partment, and during this year an 
increase was authorized in the number of 
cadets at the Military Academy. Under 
this act, the maximum number of cadets 
was fixed at 250. 

On June 18, 1812, war was declared 
against Great Britain. Our regular army 
had been greatly increased immediately 
preceding the outbreak of the war, and 
now consisted of some 36,700 men on 
paper. This number was rapidly 
increased, from time to time, by calling 

124 



YEARS OF INEFFICIENCY 

in volunteers for militia. We had appar- 
ently learned very little from the lessons 
of the Revolution. The war, taken as 
a whole, was a series of disasters and 
reverses on land, many of them highly 
discreditable in character. Our record 
on sea was much better, and we gained 
manv notable successes. The men of 
the fleet and on the individual ships of 
war were better trained and better dis- 
ciplined than those of the land forces. 
The gallant action at Lundy's Lane, 
where there was a strong nucleus of 
regulars, and minor successes on the 
Thames, formed the bulk of our credit- 
able actions on land during the period of 
the war. It should be remembered, in 
commenting upon the relative efficiency 
of the army and navy, that Congress has 
never delegated to the states the power 
to raise and maintain a navy. In 1813 

125 



AINIKIUCA'S DUTY 

there wiis a further increase in the 
stren^lh o{' the re^i^iihir army hy twenty 
reu'inients, enlisted for a year, and some 
increases in Ihe statV. There was still 
a general failure to a[)preeiate the neces- 
sity oi' [)rovi(lint>- an aile(\iiate, well- 
organized military estahlishment. We 
put some .)27,(H)(> men into the war. 
The l^ritish regular force in this country 
at no time exceeded 1(5, 800. 

Generally sj)eaking, our campaigns 
against Canada were hopelessly inefYec- 
tive. In 181 1 Commodore INrcDonough's 
hrilliant victory on Lake Champlain ter- 
minated an advance which, had it not 
heen for the naval successes, might have 
reached New \\)rk and cut off New 
Kuffland frcnn the rest of the country. 
During this war, as in the Hevolution, 
the power of a state government to inter- 
fere with military operations was illus- 

12G 



YKAllS OF INKFFICJKXCY 

tratecJ hy the action of liie governor of 
Vermont in refusing to send militia when 
(General Maeomh ealled for aid. This 
war was signalized hy the abandonment 
of our eapital to a foree about sixty per 
eent that of the defeiiders. It is true 
that most of the defenders were without 
training or disci[)iine. Only af>out 1,500 
of the Hritish foree of 3,500 were 
engaged. Our troops abandoned the 
eapital with a loss of eight killed and 
eleven wounded. 

The battle of }scw Orleans was one 
of the most remarkable victories recorded 
in our military history. It was fought 
two weeks after peace had been signed 
at Ghent. (Jur success was not without 
the element of good fortune. I'he Brit- 
ish attack was a frontal attack without 
cover, in the face of men highly trained 
in the use of the rifle. While our troops 

127 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

are entitled to a high degree of credit, 
the reports do not bring out the fact, 
however, that our success was largely 
influenced by the delay of Colonel Thorn- 
ton's highly successful attack on the 
Americans on the west bank. Had his 
assault been delivered a little earlier, 
the American line on the other side of 
the river would have been untenable 
and the result far different. While the 
battle had no influence in determining 
peace, it served as somewhat of a conso- 
lation for a long series of disasters on 
land. 

The navy's record in the war was excel- 
lent. It did all that a small force could 
have done. It aided in the victory of 
the Thames, saved the army from 
destruction at Plattsburg, and at Nor- 
folk, Bladensburg, Baltimore and New 
Orleans rendered splendid service; but 

128 



YEARS OF INEFFICIENCY 

at the end of the war Great Britain 
controlled the sea. 

The entire War of 1812 was but 
another illustration of the unwisdom of 
our general policy. No well-thought- 
out organization in time of peace — no 
sound policy in the way of preparation 
— failure to do in time of peace those 
things which cannot be done in time of 
war. Taking the war as a whole, it was 
disastrous and highly discreditable to 
us on land. The blunders were those 
of the Revolution in even a more aggra- 
vated form and with less excuse, because 
under the Constitution the government 
did have the authority to bring into 
play the entire financial and military 
resources of the nation. As Upton 
states: "Five thousand men (British) 
for the period of two years brought 
war and devastation into our territory 

129 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

and successfully withstood the misapplied 
power of seven millions of people." 

Shortly after the conclusion of the 
war, the army was again reduced and 
we returned with more or less prompt- 
ness to the old haphazard policy. In 
1821 another plan of reorganization was 
presented. This plan contemplated the 
reduction of the army to 6,C00 enlisted 
men and its maintenance as a group of 
skeletonized organizations. It is inter- 
esting to note, in this connection, that 
Mr. Calhoun, in presenting his plan, 
made the following statements: 

" To give such an organization, the 
leading principles in its formation ought 
to be, that at the commencement of hos- 
tilities there should be nothing either to 
new model or to create. The only dif- 
ference, consequently, between the peace 
and the war formation of the army ought 

130 



YEARS OF INEFFICIENCY 

to be in the increased magnitude of the 
latter, and the only change in passing 
from the former to the latter should 
consist in giving to it the augmentation 
which will then be necessary. 

"It is thus, and thus only, the dan- 
gerous transition from peace to war may 
be made without confusion or disorder, 
and the weakness and danger which 
otherwise would be inevitable, be avoided. 
Two consequences result from this prin- 
ciple : First, the organization of the staff 
in a peace establishment ought to be 
such that every branch of it should be 
completely formed, with such extension 
as the number of troops and posts occu- 
pied may render necessary; and, sec- 
ondly, that the organization of the line 
ought as far as practicable, to be such 
that in passing from the peace to the 
war formation, the force may be suffi- 

131 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

ciently augmented without adding new 
regiments or battalions, thus raising the 
army, on the basis of the peace establish- 
ment, instead of creating a new army to 
be added to the old, as at the commence- 
ment of the late war." 

Fortunate, indeed, would we have been 
had this policy been adopted, provided 
we had a reserve of trained men to bring 
the organization to war strength. But 
it was not. At that time the possibility 
of sudden invasion was remote. Most 
of our people were familiar with the use 
of the rifle. There was no possibility 
of such concentration against us as dur- 
ing recent years. The proposed organi- 
zation related wholly to the regular army, 
and did not provide for the organization 
of that great bulk of our force which 
must ahvays come from the people them- 
selves, who, within certain age limita- 

132 



YEARS OF INEFFICIENCY 

tions, must be trained, organized and 
equipped in time of peace if they are 
to be effective in war. Following the 
War of 1812 came a series of Indian 
wars, some of them of considerable mag- 
nitude. The Seminole War, the Black 
H^wk War, the Florida War, were 
conducted with various modifications of 
the military establishment, but, gener- 
ally speaking, the old pohcy was fol- 
lowed. Raw troops were raised to meet 
each emergency, with resulting tremen- 
dous expenditures of money, great loss 
of life and a high degree of inefficiency. 
On the heels of the Florida War came 
the Creek campaign. Relatively large 
numbers of troops were engaged in these 
campaigns. In the Creek campaign, for 
instance, nearly 12,000 troops were 
employed. In the three wars — the Flor- 
ida War, the Creek, and the Cherokee 

133 



AIMKlUCiVS DUTY 

War — we called into service the mili- 
tia to the niiiiiher of 48,152. To these 
should be added 12,589 regulars, making 
ouv total force (>(),(>91 engaged in these 
little campaigns. In 18;}7 there was 
a slight increase in the regular army, 
and some increase in the staff corps, but 
there was no legislation looking to the 
training, disci [)lining and equipping 
under I'ederal direction oC the oreat body 
oi' our men known as the militia. 

In 1842, innnediately after the cessa- 
tion of hostilities incident to the Florida 
campaign, the army was reduced from 
12,500 to 8,500. The lessons taught bv 
these Indian wars were the lessons of 
the Revolution and the War of 1812, 
namely, that organization and prepara- 
tion for war must be made in time of 
peace, and that undisciplined and un- 
trained troops, poorly organized, are the 

184 



YEARS OF INEFFJCIENCY 

most expensive weapons a nation ean 
employ in war. 'J'liere was needless sae- 
rifiee of life, undue prolongation of the 
war, tremendous and unnecessary ex- 
pense. Or, as Upton sums it up, the 
lessons taught hy this war are: 

"*'First: That its expense was tripled, 
if not quadru|)led, hy that feature of the 
law of 1821 which gave the president, in 
times of emergency, no discretion to 
increase the erdisted men of the army. 

" Second: That, as in every previous 
war, after successfully employing for 
short periods of service, militia and vol- 
unteers, and exhausting their enthusiasm, 
Congress found it more humane and 
economical to continue hostilities with 
regular troops, enlisted for the period 
of five years. 

"Third: That for want of a well- 
defined peace organization, a nation of 
17,000,000 of people contended for seven 

185 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

years with 1,200 warriors, and finally 
closed the struggle without accomphsh- 
ing the forcible emigration of the 
Indians, which was the original and sole 
cause of the war. 

" Without dwelling on the needless 
sacrifice of life, these hard lessons would 
have been cheaply learned, could Con- 
gress, at the end of the conflict, have 
appreciated the value of expansive 
organization. By withholding from the 
president authority to add a few enlisted 
men to the armv, it committed the same 
great error as in 1821. We shall see that 
this error more than doubled the cost and 
length of another war, which despite the 
mistakes of military legislation, was soon 
to add to the luster of our arms." 

The Mexican War furnished the next 
opportunity to illustrate what the United 
States had learned from the conduct of 

136 



YEARS OF INEFFICIENCY 

previous wars. A close study of this 
campaign discloses the fact that so far as 
the methods and system are concerned, 
little or nothing had been learned; and 
although the government had ample 
warning of the probabilities of war, little 
or Tio preparation had been made for it. 
We were opposed by an enemy inferior 
both in organization and resources; we 
had a small but good nucleus of regular 
troops. The war was sufficiently remote 
from centres of influence to give our 
officers a better opportunity than usual 
to train and discipline the new levies 
which were sent them. Moreover, we 
were singularly fortunate in having as 
commanders and subordinates an unusu- 
ally able group of officers, many of whom 
became the great commanders of the 
Civil War. The foregoing and other 
circumstances resulted in the conduct of 

137 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

the war being effective, one might almost 
say, brilliant. 

Palo Alto, Resaca de la Palma, Mon- 
terey, Buena Vista, on one line of opera- 
tions, and Vera Cruz, Cerro Gordo, 
Contreras, Churubusco and El Molino 
del Rey, on the other, tell the story of 
the war. It was, taken as a whole, our 
most successful and best conducted war; 
but in remembering this success, we must 
not forget that the system employed was 
as defective as in previous wars, and that 
the success that we had was not due to 
the system, but was attained in spite 
of it. 

The regular army had been reduced to 
an insignificant force in numbers — a 
mere nucleus — and large numbers of 
volunteers had to be called, resulting in 
huge increase in annual expenditures 
during the war. There was one hopeful 

138 



YEARS OF INEFFICIENCY 

change, however, and that was the reduc- 
tion in the proportion of militia used. 
This was not due to the experience of 
the past, but principally because the mil- 
itia was not available for service outside 
the United States. In the War of 1812 
the" force of volunteers serving for twelve 
or more months was only twelve per cent 
of the total number of troops employed. 
In the Mexican War it was approxi- 
mately eighty-eight per cent. In the 
War of 1812 a large force of militia and 
untrained volunteers was practically baf- 
fled by a force of 5,000 of the enemy's 
regulars. In the Mexican War a force 
of well-disciplined volunteers with a 
nucleus of regulars overthrew an army 
several times their number. In other 
words, in the Mexican War we had a 
good nucleus of regular troops and we 
had time to develop our volunteers into 

139 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

trained and reasonably well-disciplined 
soldiers, and we used small numbers of 
militia. What we did was not due so 
much to any idea of abandoning the old 
system with its free use of militia, as it 
was to the fact that we had to conduct a 
war where the militia could not be used 
because of the constitutional limitation 
upon its employment outside the United 
States. 

In this war the system of short enlist- 
ments jeopardized the success of military 
operations. Many of Scott's troops were 
enlisted under conditions which gave 
them the option of continuing in service 
or taking their discharge at the end of the 
year. On reaching Pueblo, he discovered 
that seven of his eleven regiments had 
decided to terminate their services at the 
conclusion of the year. Consequently he 
was stripped of a large portion of his 

140 



YEARS OF INEFFICIENCY 

effective troops; had the Mexican forces 
been capable of further activities disaster 
would certainly have resulted. 

We employed in the Mexican War 
approximately 104,000 troops of all 
arms, of whom only 12,000 were militia 
— twelve per cent of militia against 
approximately eighty-eight per cent in 
the War of 1812. 

At the close of the Mexican War the 
army was reduced from 30,890 to 10,320. 
There were some minor modifications in 
the organization of our regiments, but, 
generally speaking, little change was 
effected by the Mexican War. Discre- 
tion was given to the president to in- 
crease the strength of organizations in 
case of emergency, and incident to the 
troubles in Utah and along the Texas 
border, the president was authorized to 
accept into service of the United States 

141 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

a regiment of Texas volunteers and to 
raise two regiments of mounted infantry 
if required. There was no very impor- 
tant change in pohey with reference to 
making arrangements for possible war. 
In other words, little had been learned 
from the preceding wars, or if learned, 
had not been put into practical applica- 
tion. 



142 



CHAPTER VI 

The Price or Unpreparedness in 
THE Sixties 

"To lead an uninstructed people 
into war, is to throw them away." — 
Confucius, ^79 B. C. 

According to Upton, at the end of 
1860, with a population of 31,000,000, 
we had in our regular army 16,367. 

That army was scattered along the 
western frontier and over the vast areas 
west of the Mississippi, along the Atlan- 
tic seacoast and the northern border, and, 
roughly, provided two soldiers per mile 
for guarding the frontier; for the area 
west of the Mississippi, one soldier for 
every 120 square miles; and for the 
northwestern, or the remaining portions 

143 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

of the Union, one soldier for every 1,300 
square miles. There was almost no well- 
organized, equipped and trained militia. 
This was the general condition when 
South Carolina passed the ordinance of 
secession. That nothing had been learned 
from previous wars and that no plan of 
operations had been thought out or ade- 
quate stores prepared for sudden emer- 
gency, was indicated by the confusion 
and difficulties which followed the 
attempt to organize an army. The enlisted 
personnel of the regular army was scat- 
tered over the entire area of the country. 
Practically all of the enlisted men re- 
mained staunch in their adherence to the 
cause of the national government, but 
confusion and disorganization resulted in 
those commands which were outside the 
Union lines and filtered back piecemeal. 
The great majority of the officers 

144 



IN THE SIXTIES 

retained their commissions in the national 
service, but many of great ability ten- 
dered their resignations and reported for 
duty with the forces of their states. The 
conduct of the governors throughout the 
country largely followed party lines. In 
the south there was a general refusal to 
furnish militia for the purpose of the 
national government. Along the border 
states there was a general opposition to 
furnishing any of these troops for 
national service. In Delaware a new situ- 
ation arose, as illustrated by the procla- 
mation of the government of that state 
in response to the call for one regiment 
of militia: 

" Therefore I, William Burton, gov- 
ernor of the said State of Delaware, 
reconmiend the formation of volunteer 
companies for the protection of the lives 
and property of the people of this state 

145 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

against violence of any sort to which they 
may be exposed. For these purposes 
such companies, when formed, will be 
under the control of the state authorities, 
though not subject to be ordered by the 
executive into the United States service, 
the law not vesting in him such author- 
ity. They will, however, have the option 
of offering their services to the general 
government for the defense of its capital 
and the support of the Constitution and 
laws of the country." 

As a general rule, the governors of the 
states which refused militia, acted on 
their own initiative, and did not refer the 
matter to the state legislature. Six states 
to which an appeal was made for the 
service of militia and refused by the gov- 
ernors, afterwards furnished 252,000 
men to the Union cause. This illustrates 
how completely, under the militia sys- 

146 



IN THE SIXTIES 

tern, a governor can paralyze the military 
resources of his own state, the people of 
which in large part may be desirous of 
meeting the national demand. 

The story of the militia as a whole 
illustrates the utter folly of depending 
upon any system which leaves the control 
of any portion of the military establish- 
ment upon which the nation must depend 
in war, in the hands of the governor of 
a state, or of anyone else other than the 
federal authority. The entire military 
force upon which the nation is to depend 
in war must be under the control of the 
federal government absolutely and com- 
pletely, and be trained, disciplined and 
organized by it, if war is to be waged 
efficiently. In the turmoil and confusion 
of the moment, President Lincoln was 
compelled, as a matter of national safety, 
to assume dictatorial power. It was 

147 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

indeed fortunate for the nation that we 
had at that time a man as president who 
was wilhng to assume this responsibihty. 
In order to meet the emergency in 
part, at least, President Lincoln, by proc- 
lamation, increased the strength of the 
regular army approximately 23,000 men, 
and the navy 18,000 men. This action 
was subsequently confirmed by Congress. 
In addition to the natural inevitable 
results of an entire lack of military policy 
was the condition of rebellion, which had 
disrupted to a certain extent the small 
standing army and rendered unavailable 
the military resources of the nation in the 
way of supplies. JNIany of the northern 
arsenals had been largely stripped of 
supplies. There was a condition of veri- 
table military chaos. Fortunately for 
the safety of the country and the out- 
come of the war, the South was unpre- 

148 



IN THE SIXTIES 

pared and had available no well organ- 
ized force to take advantage promptly of 
the helplessness of the national govern- 
ment. 

An attempt was made by the federal 
authorities to organize a force of regu- 
lars and volunteers on sound lines. The 
regiments were to be of three battalions, 
two at the front and one as a depot bat- 
talion. It was also proposed to treat 
volunteers as a purely federal force, the 
officers to be commissioned by the presi- 
dent. The commission, composed of reg- 
ular officers whose report embodied these 
suggestions, acted on sound lines, but 
their views and recommendations were 
rejected, and the volunteers were, to a 
certain extent, state troops; to the gov- 
ernors was left the appointing of offi- 
cers. This, coupled with the employment 
of untrained, poorly organized and offi- 

149 



AMERICA S DUTY 

cered militia, was another of the serious 
blunders in the early stages of the war. 
If the proposition of the board of 
regular officers had been approved, we 
should have entered the war on a com- 
paratively sound basis and undoubtedly 
terminated it in much less time than was 
eventually necessary, and with much less 
loss of life and expenditure of money; 
but under the policy adopted, governors 
of states soon showed a distinct tendency 
to create new regiments instead of filling 
up their old ones. The new regiments 
gave an opportunity to appoint new offi- 
cers — in other words, local politics was 
exerting a strong influence in the build- 
ing up of the militarj^ establishment. 
Had the appointment of officers rested 
with the president and the policy been 
adopted of keeping the old regiments 
full, we should have very soon had a 

150 



IN THE SIXTIES 

highly effective and eiScient force. The 
handful of regular officers and men was 
the nucleus around which the whole vol- 
unteer military establishment rallied. 

No attempt will be made to follow in 
detail the conduct of the war. All that 
itns desired to point out is that the militia 
feature of the system was a failure and 
that the volunteer system, as such, failed 
both in the Northern and Southern army. 
The spirit of the volunteers was splendid, 
but the system was unsound and could 
not be depended upon. It failed as it 
had always failed and will always fail. 
The Confederacy was forced to resort to 
the draft in April, 1862; the national 
government published its first draft order 
in August, 1862, and resorted to the gen- 
eral draft the following year. Deser- 
tion was rampant. Such great numbers 
deserted that efficiency was greatly 

151 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

impaired. Great numbers of officers were 
dismissed, and still greater numbers were 
got rid of as unfit for the service. 

The bounty — that evil child of the 
Revolution — soon came into being and 
was in this, as in other wars, one of the 
strongest influences in debauching the 
patriotism of our people and lowering 
the standards of the individual apprecia- 
tion of the obligation for the national 
service. With it went a still greater evil, 
namely, the purchase of substitutes. It 
is difficult to conceive anything more at 
variance ^Wth the principles of represen- 
tative government and individual obliga- 
tion for national service in war, than the 
practice of buying substitutes, a practice 
which made it possible for the rich to 
avoid ser\'ice and escape the dangers and 
hardships of a campaign by paying other 
men to render their service for them. 

152 



IN THE SIXTIES 

The effect of both the bounty and the 
purchase of substitutes was seen directly 
in the lowering of the general sentiment 
of individual obligation for service, and 
in the vastly increased number of deser- 
tions. 

In fact, those two procedures, the 
bounty and the purchase of substitutes, 
have done more than anything else to 
degrade and debauch that sense of indi- 
vidual obligation in time of war which 
should animate a people. They have 
struck at the very foundation on which 
the republic rests: an appreciation and 
acceptance of the principle that with 
manhood suffrage goes manhood obHga- 
tion for service. 

At the end of two years the armies on 
both sides began to reach a state of real 
efficiency, but it had been gained at a 
great and unnecessary cost in life and 

153 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

treasure. Each side was laboring under 
somewhat the same difficulties, although 
the South, as far as the conduct of the 
war was concerned, was far better organ- 
ized, in that it waged war more as a 
nation than the North, which greatly 
weakened itself in the conduct of the war 
through surrendering to the governors of 
the states too much of the federal power 
in matters pertaining to the raising and 
officering of troops. The Confederacy 
really conducted the war as a nation; the 
Union as a confederacy. By so doing, 
the Confederacy added at least fifty per 
cent to its efficiency. New regiments 
were not created to the extent that they 
were in the North. The government was 
sufficiently centralized to conduct the war 
with a much greater degree of efficiency 
than was the Union government. Volun- 
teering, as could have been expected, and 

154 



IN THE SIXTIES 

doubtless was expected by all who had 
any knowledge of our military history, 
diminished after the first excitement was 
over, and the draft was in general appli- 
cation, both in the North and the South. 

At the end of the Civil War we were 
for the first and only time in our history 
prepared for war with a first-class 
power. We had an admirable navy and 
army, experienced, well organized, well 
equipped. Our condition of prepared- 
ness was recognized by foreign govern- 
ments, as indicated by the prompt 
evacuation of Mexico by Napoleon upon 
the request of this government. 

Once the Mexican difficulty was set- 
tled, the strength of the regular army 
was gradually reduced. The strength 
fluctuated from year to year. In 1898 
it amounted to 28,747. At the close of 
the Civil War, until the outbreak of the 

155 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

war with Spain, the army was principally 
engaged in Indian operations in the 
West, work which was largely of a police 
character. Men were kept in the service 
as long as practical; knowledge of the 
language, of the country and the habits 
of the Indian, made the re-enlisted man 
valuable. It was really a military police 
force and not an army in the proper 
sense of the word. The organizations 
were skeletonized and kept at reduced 
strength. 

This period was, from the standpoint 
of military progress, a period of dry rot, 
interrupted occasionally by sporadic 
activities incident to Indian outbreaks. 
The organizations were full of old sol- 
diers. The work of the army was valu- 
able in the highest sense as an aid in the 
development of the Great West, and this 
portion of its work is one of the most 

156 



IN THE SIXTIES 

interesting from the standpoint of local 
history; but it was not a period marked 
by military progress or development. 
Promotion was slow; officers reached 
command grade when they were too old 
to exercise it. The militia was, generally 
speaking, inefficient and of little or no 
military value. Our regular army equip- 
ment was years behind that of the great 
military powers of Europe; we showed 
all the effects of our peaceful slumber, 
so far as military development went. 
Interest in military matters was reduced 
to a minimum; people were principally 
concerned in the development of the nat- 
ural resources of the country, opening up 
lines of communication, building rail- 
roads, turning natural wealth into money. 
For a long time after the war we had 
available for service from a million and a 
half to two million men who had served 

157 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

through the Civil war, and many thou- 
sands of able officers; in other words, we 
had an unorganaized though trained re- 
serve. 

In the thirty-three years which had 
elapsed between the Civil War and the 
war with Spain, which now began to 
loom up, nearly all this personnel had 
ceased to be valuable through age, phys- 
ical disability and many other less impor- 
tant causes, such as change in arms and 
equipment. When the war with Spain 
began, it was at once apparent that noth- 
ing of importance whatever had been 
taken to heart from the lessons of the 
Civil War, and that we were wholly un- 
prepared from every standpoint. We 
were without reserves of men, officers or 
material. We were using an obsolete 
rifle, antiquated artillery, black powder. 
In fact, we were a military *' Rip Van 

158 



IN THE SIXTIES 

Winkle." Fortunately, our navy was 
stronger than the navy of our enemy, 
and our coasts were free from molesta- 
tion. 

Our condition at that time was one of 
disorganization and unpreparedness. On 
every side was lack of well-thought-out 
preparation. A clumsy, bureaucratic 
system of administration crumbled under 
the first pressure which was put upon it; 
the sanitary administration of our camps 
showed in many instances lack of elemen- 
tary knowledge and reasonable prudence, 
and an entire want of discipline. There 
were some marked exception, but gen- 
erally speaking, sanitary incompetency, 
together with administrative failure, 
served to give us a death list from dis- 
eases many times greater than that from 
bullets. 



159 



chapter vii 
The Value of Preparedness 

"The safety of the United States, 
under divine protection, ought to rest 
on the basis of systematic and solid 
arrangements exposed as little as pos- 
sible to the hazards of fortuitous cir- 
cumstances." — George Washington, 
Third Annual Address. 

The safety of our country and its insti- 
tutions, the opportunity to enjoy hfe, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness 
under the American flag, will be jeop- 
ardized unless there is well-thought-out, 
well-organized preparedness — a prepar- 
edness based upon the principle that with 
equality in the opportunities and privi- 
leges of citizenship goes hand in hand 
equality of obligation for service to the 
nation in peace or war. 

160 



VALUE OF PREPAREDNESS 

Citizenship means a great deal or it 
means nothing. To the savage without 
a country it is a meaningless word. 

To the Roman it meant everything. 
Our nation must be prepared if our gov- 
ernment is to give us that type of citizen- 
ship which carries with it the privilege 
and the honors which the word implies 
when applied to the citizens of a great 
country, a citizenship of the type implied 
in the words of the centurion to those 
who were about to scourge Saint Paul 
without trial, " Take heed what thou 
doest for this man is a Roman." 

While just and tolerant we must be 
prepared and strong enough on land and 
sea so that those contemplating injury to 
one of our citizens may hear the warning 
voice *' Take heed what thou doest for 
this man is an American." 

The people whom preparedness most 

161 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

concerns, both from their number and in 
the unfortunate result of the absence of 
preparedness, are the wives and the fami- 
hes of the men who in war constitute the 
rank and file of our armies. The great 
mass of our population, they feel more 
severely than any other class the results 
of a disastrous war — the loss of men, the 
loss of protectors and supporters. We 
desire for them a better destiny. 

Avoidance of war will be rendered far 
more probable and peace far more secure 
by such well-ordered measures in the way 
of preparedness as will protect us against 
unjust aggression, and by such sound 
training and education of our children as 
will fill them with a sense of justice and 
fair dealing. 

Whether or not the time will come 
when war will be controlled by a league 
of nations, and a discussion of difficulties 

162 



VALUE OF PREPAREDNESS 

insisted upon before a resort to force, is 
a question which time alone can answer. 
We hope it may be so. In the meantime, 
work for this as we may and as we 
should, we must not forget the situation 
which confronts us, the conditions which 
surround us. 

As we look back over the long and 
needlessly costly wars of the past, we 
realize how much was due to the lack of 
preparedness. 

The practical and vital questions that 
now concern us are: Have we learned 
anything from these hideously costly and 
wasteful wars? Are we prepared to take 
steps necessary to establish a rational 
degree of preparedness, which will not 
only serve as an insurance for peace but 
will, if we are forced into war, make it 
short and limit the expenditure of life to 
the minimum. Or are we going on to 

163 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

our next war without organization and 
without preparation, depending upon the 
unexpected, some happy chance, some 
dreamed-of invention, which will make 
good our lack of preparation, or tend to 
insure our protection? Men work their 
own miracles in matters of defense. 

The onlv war we have to fear is war 
with a highly organized and thoroughly 
prepared power of the first class. Noth- 
ing will protect us against defeat or 
destruction in such a war, except the 
most thorough organization and careful 
preparation made in time of peace. We 
must remember the world-old slogan, 
than which truer words were never 
uttered, " In time of peace prepare for 
war." We might vary it by saying, '' In 
time of peace make such preparation 
against war as will make it improbable," 
but however we state it, it means prep- 

164 



VALUE OF PREPAREDNESS 

aration — careful, thorough and well 
thought out. 

In considering this great question, it 
must constantly be borne in mind that we 
have never yet in all our history engaged 
single-handed in war with a first-class 
power prepared for war. This experi- 
ence is undoubtedly before us unless our 
history is to be different from that of all 
other peoples, an assumption which is 
wholly unwarranted. We may see no 
concrete danger at the present, but in 
these times, although at peace, we are 
like a ship in the cyclone area with mes- 
sages constantly coming in over the wire- 
less, bearing tales of storm and disaster 
all about us. We are poor sailors and 
unworthy of the trust and responsibility 
placed upon us if we do not take heed of 
the warnings. 

Our wars have been hideously wasteful 

165 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

of life because we have sent the youth 
of our country into war untrained and 
undisciplined — even worse, we have sent 
them unprepared either to take care of 
themselves or to render efficient service 
as soldiers. We have required of them 
the sacrifice but we have not given them 
the opportunity to make it reasonably 
effective. We have sent them untrained, 
willing, but unprepared; we have sent 
them under officers ignorant of their ele- 
mentary duties. We have thrown away 
their lives with reckless, brutal prodigal- 
ity. Fortunately for our interests and 
national life, our enemies have either 
been inferior in strength and resources, 
or, like ourselves, have been unprepared 
and have had to learn the art of war 
while engaged in war. 

This would be impossible in case of 
war with a strong, well-organized nation, 

166 



VALUE OF PREPAREDNESS 

a nation whose effort is founded upon 
well-thought-out preparation — a nation 
which has not left all the burden of war 
for the moment of war, but has prepared 
in advance, her organization, including 
reserves of men, her equipment and ade- 
quate supplies to make good the con- 
sumption and losses of war. 

A policy which permits a people to 
drift on willing but unprepared, in spite 
of all the lessons of the past, ignorantly 
proposing to place the burdens of war 
wholly upon the period of war, is a policy 
which spells destruction for this or any 
other people foolish enough to adopt and 
follow it. It is a policy which must meet 
the strong condemnation of every patri- 
otic man who has an interest either in the 
lives of his people or the welfare of his 
country. No soldier worthy of the name, 
either from the standpoint of informa- 

167 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

tion or that of patriotic impulse, could 
for a moment advocate such a pohcy 
unless bowing to political opportunism 
rather than seeking the welfare and 
safety of his country. The experience 
and lessons of the past are especially 
valuable if we will but heed them, for 
the lessons taught by mistakes are oft- 
times, to honest, open-minded men, as 
valuable as success. 

Our system has been most undemo- 
cratic. We have induced our people by 
bounty, by gifts of land and other means, 
to discharge their plain military obliga- 
tions. We have encouraged a system 
which has enabled the rich to escape the 
blood tax — the sei^ice in war — through 
their ability to buy others to take their 
places in the ranks. I refer to the 
unspeakably contemptible, unpatriotic 
and, for the future, I hope, impossible 

168 



VALUE OF PREPAREDNESS 

practice of buying substitutes. Further 
resort to these vicious practices should 
not be permitted. They have no place 
in a true democracy. 

Every good American honors the real 
volunteer spirit, but it is difficult to 
understand how any man who is familiar 
with our country's history can advocate 
the continuance of the volunteer system, 
with its uncertainties, unpreparedness 
and lack of equality of service. We have 
been warned repeatedly by the experi- 
ence of others of the folly of depending 
upon the volunteer system. The lack of 
training, the uncertainty in the way of 
returns, the cost, the confusion, have all 
served to demonstrate the danger of the 
procedure; the danger to us has been 
greatly increased by the thoroughness of 
modern organization and the rapidity 
with which armies can be transported 

169 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

over land or sea to deliver attacks in 
force. 

Washington's letters are full of advice 
against trusting to uncertain returns and 
insisting upon organaization and prep- 
aration. The best and bravest have 
always rushed to the colors first. They 
are willing but unprepared, and prove 
an almost vmavailing sacrifice. After 
the excitement wears off, men no longer 
come, as was seen during the Revolution 
and during the Civil War. Then comes 
the use of the bountv, a most vicious and 
demoralizing practice, and then the draft, 
and this always in the crisis of a struggle. 
What system could be more dangerous in 
these days of organized preparedness? 

Service to the nation and for the 
nation in war is a service which every 
man, rich and poor, must give, if 
required, subject only to the limitations 

170 



VALUE OF PREPAREDNESS 

of age and health. When this vital prin- 
ciple is generally recognized and the 
rich and the poor stand shoulder to 
shoulder in the nation's service, there will 
be much less of class distinction and 
much more solidarity and a better 
national spirit. Individuals with more 
intelligence than courage admit the gen- 
eral proposition that manhood suffrage 
goes hand in hand with manhood service, 
and still state that the country is not yet 
ready for it. If it is not ready it is 
because they and others of their kind 
lack the courage to state and urge their 
convictions. If there was ever a time in 
the history of this country when it is 
apparent that this great principle should 
be urged as the only just and equitable 
one — the only one on which we can safely 
rely — it is to-day, with the lessons of the 
greatest of all wars before our eyes. 

171 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

That struggle shows conclusively, as 
have our past wars, that a volunteer sys- 
tem cannot be depended upon and that 
dependence upon such a system means 
hastily-raised and untrained armies, offi- 
cered by willing but uninstructed officers. 
It means campaigns accompanied by 
losses unnecessarily great and attended 
by results far short of what could have 
been obtained. 

We must continue our efforts for 
World Peace, encourage arbitration, do 
all we can to extend its application, but 
while doing this we must not forget the 
fact — if we do we shall aid in accom- 
plishing the destruction of our own 
nation — that the era of World Peace has 
not yet arrived, and that arbitration is 
not yet of general application. We 
must not only be just, tolerant and 
upright in all our dealings with other 

172 



VALUE OF PREPAREDNESS 

people, but we must also be ready to 
meet the strength of evil with the force 
of right. 

Our people must be organized and pre- 
pared in order that they may be able to 
uphold the institutions they believe in, 
defend the right, and if need be, aid the 
oppressed. 

It is unfortunate that we cannot 
depend upon our own fair dealing and 
sense of justice to protect us, but never- 
theless it is a fact that we cannot. In 
seeking the ideal we must not forget the 
actual; we must not let our hopes for 
the future regulate entirely our conduct 
at the present. A people may dream of 
peace and work for it, but they should 
not lose sight of the fact that it is not 
yet among us. We are struggling for 
the elimination of dreaded diseases, but, 
realizing that we have not thus far been 

173 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

successful, we take every possible pre- 
caution against them. So it is with war. 

It is a pathetic sight to see a great 
people, despite all the teachings of his- 
tory, follow counsels which must lead not 
only to unnecessary sacrifice of life, but 
even perhaps to the loss of national free- 
dom. It is the duty of all who have 
gathered anything from the history of 
the past, to bring before the people 
frankly the lessons taught by the past 
results of lack of organization and 
preparation. 

The professional pacifist, the advocate 
of unpreparedness and nonresistance, is 
the most dangerous of our citizens. He 
is generally eminently respectable. He 
is like the well-dressed and well-groomed 
typhoid carrier, as he goes about, poison- 
ing the very life of the people. He 
advocates a policy which if adopted will 

174 



VALUE OF PREPAREDNESS 

surely end in great and unnecessary loss 
of life, if not in the final loss of our 
national liberty. In him lie the possibil- 
ities of future disaster. 

Assuming that our cause is just, non- 
resistance and unpreparedness mean the 
establishment of a condition which pre- 
vents our effectively defending the right. 
It assures the subordination of good to 
evil. It is the most brutal of all policies, 
as well as the most cowardly and sinis- 
ter; brutal in that it insures the unneces- 
saray loss of thousands upon thousands 
of our people in a struggle that is fruit- 
less because it is unprepared and unor- 
ganized. It is the more cowardly and 
sinister in that it is an admission that 
there is nothing worth fighting for — that 
there are no great principles which are 
worth the sacrifice of life. It is a policy 
which marks the decadence of a people, 

175 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

and if followed by the bulk of a nation 
means that its end is at hand. 

Preparedness is based upon organiza- 
tion. National preparedness means far 
more than the mere organization of the 
army and navy. It means, first of all, 
the moral organization of the people, an 
organization which creates in the heart of 
every citizen a sense of his obligation for 
service to the nation in time of war or 
other difficulty. This is the greatest part 
of organization, and if once accomplished 
all the rest follows easily and naturally. 
The organization of the industrial 
resources of the country would place the 
government in possession of full knowl- 
edge concerning the capacity of each 
industrial plant — just what it can do, 
how much, and when — and at the same 
time would place in the possession of the 
various industrial organizations an exact 

176 



VALUE OF PREPAREDNESS 

knowledge of what was expected of them 
and would see to it that they are properly 
equipped to discharge their obligations 
promptly when called upon. An organ- 
ization which takes into consideration 
transportation, communications and sup- 
ply; the organization of the sanitary 
service, and of the various special groups 
of highly-trained men; an organization 
of the financial system of the country so 
that it may have the elasticity and expan- 
sibility to meet the demands of war; the 
organization of the economical resources 
of the country ; the careful study of ways 
and means to make good shortages; 
organization of our chemical resources; 
provision as far as possible of substitutes 
for things which are not found within 
our own limits, so that we may be sup- 
plied in case of loss of sea power — all 
these things come under organization and 

177 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

require much time for their considera- 
tion. This cannot be accomphshed in the 
haste and confusion of war. 

A wise nation, reahzing that its safety 
depends upon preparation, and that 
preparation depends upon organization, 
gives careful heed to all these questions. 
It is a vital part of national policy. 

The fighting forces of the nation, the 
land and sea forces, might be compared 
to the edge of an extremely heavy knife. 
The mass of steel behind the edge repre- 
sents trained reserves of men, reserves of 
munitions, organization, transportation, 
communication, sanitaray units, special 
service groups — in brief, all that great 
mass of organization which measures the 
might of the nation, which serves to renew 
the cutting edge and to give it the rigidity 
and weight necessary to force it home. It 
is the type of organization which makes 

178 



VALUE OF PREPAREDNESS 

it possible to apply promptly the might 
of the nation, and to maintain it for the 
maximum period of time; it is organiza- 
tion which leaves nothing to chance. 
It is a recognition of the fact that effi- 
ciency can be secured only through 
preparation, and that preparation rests 
upon organization. 

This sort of preparation makes for 
national unity, consequently for national 
strength. It involves having all the men 
of a certain age doing something in com- 
mon for the nation at the same time. It 
makes for national solidarity; it tends to 
do away with class distinctions. It tends 
to build up a truer national spirit, to fuse 
the various elements into a homogeneous 
mass which, with us, would be one of real 
Americanism. It tends to the establish- 
ment of a condition which will obliterate 
the sharp distinctions between the rich and 

179 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

the poor, the distinctions of race and 
creed, and to make us one homogeneous 
mass fused by common patriotic impulses. 
A people not only willing but organized 
and trained for peace and, if need be, for 
war. 

If we have faith in our institutions and 
confidence in ourselves, and believe our 
purpose in the world is a worthy one, this 
is a condition which we should strive to 
attain. Its attainment will result in bet- 
ter citizens, better men physically, men 
better morally and more efficient from 
the economic standpoint, men more tol- 
erant and more observant of the rights 
of others. They will be better physically 
because of the training which will have 
placed their bodies more fully under the 
control of their will, will have built up 
their muscles, corrected their physical 
defects, taught them how to protect 

180 



VALUE OF PREPAREDNESS 

themselves in camp and field and to ward 
off disease and infection. They will be 
better citizens morally because of the dis- 
cipline they have had. They will be more 
observant of the law and the constituted 
authorities; more observant of the rights 
of others; more efficient economically 
because of their habits of discipline, regu- 
larity and promptness. They will appre- 
ciate that with the rights and opportuni- 
ties of citizenship go its obligations. 
They will be all-around better citizens, 
and collectively we shall be a better 
nation. 

An approximate idea of the unneces- 
sary cost of our military establishment 
resulting from an unsound military pol- 
icy, is indicated by the statement on the 
following page, taken from Huidekoper's 
statement to the Military Affairs Com- 
mittee of the Senate. 

181 



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chapter viii 
What We Should Do 

"Oh^ ye Athenians, yet is there time ! 
And there is one manner in which you 
can recover your greatness, or, dying, 
fall worthy of your past — go yourself, 
every man of you, and stand in the 
ranks ; and either a victory beyond all 
victories in its glory awaits you, or, 
falling, you shall fall greatly and 
worthy of your past." — Demosthenes 
to the Athenians. 

Our past military policy, so far as it 
concerns the land forces, has been thor- 
oughlj^ unsound and in violation of basic 
military principles. We have succeeded 
not because of it, but in spite of it. It 
has been unnecessarily and brutally 
costly in human life and recklessly 
extravagant in the expenditure of treas- 

183 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

ure. It has tended greatly to prolong 
our wars and consequently has delayed 
national development. 

Because we have succeeded in spite of 
an unsound sj^stem, those who do not 
look beneath the surface fail to recognize 
the numerous shortcomings of that sys- 
tem, or appreciate how dangerous is our 
further dependence upon it. 

The time has come to put our house in 
order through the establishment of a 
sound and dependable system, and to 
make such wise and prudent preparation 
as will enable us to defend successfully 
our country and our rights. 

No such system can be established 
which does not rest upon equality of serv- 
ice for all who are physically fit and of 
proper age. Manhood suffrage means 
manhood obligation for service in peace 
or war. This is the basic principle upon 

184 



WHAT WE SHOULD DO 

which truly representative government, 
or free democracy, rests and must rest if 
it is successfully to withstand the shock 
of modern war. 

The acceptance of this fundamental 
principle will require to a certain extent 
the moral organization of the people, the 
building up of that sense of individual 
obligation for service to the nation which 
is the basis of true patriotism, the teach- 
ing of our people to think in terms of the 
nation rather than in those of a locality 
or of personal interest. 

This organization must also be accom- 
panied b}^ the organization, classification 
and training of our men and the detailed 
and careful organization of the material 
resources of the country with the view to 
making them promptly available in case 
of need and to remedying any defects. 

In the organization of our land forces 

185 



AMERICANS DUTY 



we must no longer place reliance upon 
plans based upon the development of 
volunteers or the use of the militia. 
The volunteer system is not dependable 
because of the uncertainty as to returns, 
and in anj'^ case because of lack of time 
for training and organization. 

Modern wars are often initiated with- 
out a formal declaration of war or by a 
declaration which is coincident with the 
first act of w^'ir. 

Dependence upon militia under state 
control or partially under state control, 
spells certain disaster, not because of the 
quality of the men or officers, but because 
of the system under which they work. 

We nuist also have a first-class navy, 
^^'ell balanced and thoroughly equipped 
with all necessary appliances afloat and 
ashore. It is the first line of defense. 

We need a highly efficient regular 

186 



WHAT WE SHOULD DO 

army, adequate to the peace needs of the 
nation. By this is meant a regular force, 
fully equipped, thoroughly trained and 
properly organized, with adequate 
reserves of men and material, and a 
i'ovee sufficient to garrison our over-sea 
possessions, including the Philippines and 
the Hawaiian Islands. These latter are 
the key to the Pacific and one of the main 
defenses of our Pacific coast and the 
Panama Canal, and whoever holds them 
dominates the trade routes of the greater 
portion of the Pacific and, to a large 
extent, that ocean. The army must be 
sufficient also to provide an adequate 
garrison for the Panama Canal, which is 
an implement of commerce and an instru- 
ment of war so valuable that we must not 
under any conditions allow it to lie out- 
side our secure grasp. 

The regular force must also be ade- 

187 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

quate to provide suiRcient troops for 
our coast defenses and such garrisons 
as may be required in Porto Rico and 
Alaska. The regular force must also 
be sufficient to provide the necessary 
mobile force in the United States; by 
this is meant a force of cavalry, infan- 
try, field artillery, engineers and aux- 
iliary troops sufficient to provide an 
expeditionary force such as we sent to 
Cuba in 1898, and at the same time to 
provide a force sufficient to meet pos- 
sible conditions of internal disorder. 
It must also furnish training units for 
the National Guard, or whatever force 
the federal government may eventually 
establish in place of it, and provide suffi- 
cient officers for duty under the detail 
system in the various departments, 
instructors at the various colleges and 
schools w^here military instruction is or 

188 



WHAT WE SHOULD DO 

may be established, attaches abroad and 
officers on special missions. 

The main reliance in a war with a 
first-class power will ultimately be the 
great force of citizen soldiers forming 
a purely federal force, thoroughly organ- 
ized and equipped with reserves of men 
and material. This force must be trained 
under some system which will permit 
the instruction to be given in part dur- 
ing the school period or age, thereby 
greatly reducing the time required for 
the final intensive period of training, 
which should be under regular officers 
and in conjunction with regular troops. 
In brief, the system must be one which 
utilizes as far as possible the means and 
opportunities now available, and inter- 
feres as little as possible with the educa- 
tional or industrial careers of those 
affected. A system moulded on the gen- 

189 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

eral lines of the Australian or Swiss^ 
will accomplish this. Some modifications 
will be required to meet our conditions. 
Each year about one million men reach 
the military age of 18; of tliis number 
not more than fifty per cent are fit for 
military service, this being about the 
average in other countries. Far less 
than fifty per cent come up to the stand- 
ards required for the regular army, but 
the minor defects rejecting them for 
the regular army would not reject them 
for general military service. Assuming 
that some system on the general lines 
of the Australian or Swiss must be 
eventually adopted in this country, it 
would seem that about 500,000 men 
would be available each year for military 
training. If the boys were prepared by 
the state authorities, through training 

^See Appendix for complete description. 
190 



WHAT WE SHOULD DO 

in schools and colleges, and in state 
training areas — when the boys were not 
in school — to the extent that they are 
in Switzerland or Australia, it would be 
possible, when they come up for federal 
training, to finish their military train- 
ing — so far as preparing them for the 
duties of enlisted men is concerned — 
within a period of approximately three 
months. We should be able to limit 
the period of first line obligation to the 
period from eighteen to twenty-five, 
inclusive, or seven years, or we could 
make the period of obligatory service 
begin two years later and extend it to 
twenty-seven. This procedure would 
give in the first line approximately three 
and one-half millions of men at the age 
of best physical condition and of mini- 
mum dependent and business respon- 
sibility. From the men of certain years 

191 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

(classes) of this period, organizations 
of federal forces should be built up to 
the extent of at least twenty-five divi- 
sions. They would be organized and 
equipped exactly like the regular armj^ 
and would be held ready for immediate 
service as our present militia would be 
were it under federal control. 

Men of these organizations would not 
live in uniform but would go about their 
regular occupations as do the members 
of the militia to-day, but they would 
be equipped, organized and ready for 
immediate service. If emergency required 
it, additional organizations could be 
promptly raised from the men who were 
within the obligatory period. 

There should be no pay in peace time 
except when the men were on duty and 
then it should be merely nominal. The 
duty should be recognized as a part of 

192 



WHAT WE SHOULD DO 

the man's citizenship obligation to the 
nation. The organizations to be made 
up of men within the period of obhga- 
tory service, could be filled either by the 
men who indicated their desire for such 
training or by drawing them by lot. This 
is a matter of detail. The regular army 
as organized would be made up as to-day; 
it would be a professional armj^ The 
men who came into it would be men who 
had received in youth this citizenship 
training. They would come into the 
regular army because they wanted to be 
professional soldiers. The regular army 
would be to a certain extent the train- 
ing nucleus for the citizen soldier organ- 
izations and would be the force garrison- 
ing our over-sea possessions. It would 
be much easier to maintain our regular 
army in a highly efficient condition, as 
general military training would have pro- 

193 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

duced a respect for the uniform and an 
appreciation of the importance of a 
soldier's duty. 

The reserve corps of officers would be 
composed of men who had had longer 
and more advanced training, and could 
be recruited and maintained as indicated 
below, through further training of men 
from the military schools and colleges 
and those from the officers' training corps 
units of the nonmilitary universities and 
colleges. There would also be those from 
the military training camps and other 
sources, such as men who have served in 
the army and have the proper qualifica- 
tions. This would give a military estab- 
lishment in which every man would be 
physically fit to play his part and would 
have finished his obligation in what was 
practically his early manhood, with little 
probability of being called upon again 

194 



WHAT WE SHOULD DO 

unless the demands of war were so great 
as to require more men than those of the 
total first line, eighteen to twenty-five 
years, inclusive. Then they would be 
called by years as the occasion required, 
anci would be available for service up to 
their forty-fifth year. It would give 
us a condition of real national prepared- 
ness, a much higher type of citizenship, 
a lower criminal rate and an enormously 
improved economic efficiency. Pending 
the establishment of such a system, every 
effort should be made to transfer the 
state militia to federal control. By this 
is meant its complete removal from state 
control and its establishment as a purely 
federal force, having no more relation 
to the states than the regular army has 
at present. This force under federal 
control will make a very valuable nucleus 
for the building up of a federal force 

195 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

of citizen soldiers. Officers and men 
should be transferred with their present 
grades and ratings. 

The states have full authority to main- 
tain a military force of their own and 
under their exclusive control, if they 
desire to do so. Pennsylvania has estab- 
lished a state constabulary and in doing 
so has taken a long step in the right 
direction. Pennsylvania has not had to 
call upon her militia for strike or riot 
duty for a good many years. 

As has been recommended by the Gen- 
eral Staff, there should be built up 
with the least possible dela}^ a corps of 
at least 50,000 reserve officers, on lines 
and through means recommended by the 
General Staff, and by means of a further 
development of the United States Mili- 
tary Training Camps for college students 
and older men, which have been in opera- 

196 



WHAT WE SHOULD DO 

tion for a number of years. These plans 
include the coordination of the instruc- 
tion at the various military colleges and 
schools and the establishment of well- 
thought-out plans for the noimiilitary 
colleges at which it may be decided to 
establish officers' training corps units on 
lines now under consideration. 

This number of officers, fifty thousand, 
may seem excessive to some, but when 
it is remembered that there were one 
hundred and twenty-seven thousand offi- 
cers in the Northern army during the 
Civil War, and over sixty thousand in 
the Southern, fifty thousand will not 
appear to be excessive. Fifty thousand 
officers will be barely sufficient properly 
to officer a million and a half citizen 
soldiers. We had in service, North and 
South, during the Civil War, over four 
million men, and at the end of the war 

197 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

we had approximately one and a quarter 
million under arms. 

Under legislative provision enacted 
during the Civil War, commonly known 
as the Morrill Act, Congress established 
mechanical and agricultural colleges in 
each state, among otlier things prescrib- 
ing military instruction and providing 
for this purpose officers of the regular 
army. There are nearly thirty thousand 
students at these institutions who receive 
during their course military instruction 
for periods of from one to two years. 
In some cases the instruction is excellent; 
in others it is very poor. 

There are in addition a large number 
of military colleges and schools; at these 
there are some ten thousand students, 
so that there are approximately forty 
thousand young men receiving military 
instruction, nearly all of them under offi- 

198 



WHAT WK SHOULD DO 

cers of the army. This means a grad- 
iialin^ elass of about eigFit thousaii(J, of 
whom not more tlian forty-five hundred 
woul(J he fit to underp»-o mihtary training'. 

These men sliould f)e assemf)led in 
CJrtited States Mihtary l^'aining Cam[)s 
for periods of five weeks eaeii for two 
eonseeutive years, in order tfiat they 
may receive tliat practical and tfiorough 
instruction which in the majority of 
instances is not possible during their col- 
lege course. With tliese should be assem- 
bled tlie men wfio [uivc taken the officers' 
training course at tfie various nonmili- 
tary universities. This course, as out- 
lined })y the Cieneral Staff, will be thor- 
ough and conducted, so far as the purely 
military courses and duties are concerned, 
under the immediate control of officers 
of the army. 

From all these sources we have prac- 
199 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

tically an inexhaustible supply of mate- 
rial from which excellent reserve officers 
can be made. From the men assembled 
in camp each year, fifteen hundred should 
be selected and commissioned, subject 
only to a physical examination, as they 
are all men of college type, for one year 
as second lieutenants in the line and in 
the various staff corps and departments 
of the regular army. They should receive 
the pay and allowance of second lieu- 
tenants, or such pay and allowance as 
may be deemed to be appropriate. 

The men who receive this training 
would furnish very good material for 
reserve officers of the grade of captain 
and major, whereas as a rule the men 
who have not had this training would 
qualify only in the grade of lieutenant. 

From this group of men could well 
be selected, subject to the prescribed 

200 



WHAT WE SHOULD DO 

mental and physical examination, the 
greater portion of the candidates from 
civil life for appointment in the army. 
We have the material and the machinery 
for tm-ning out an excellent corps of 
reserve officers. All that is needed is to 
take hold of it and shape it. 

The prompt building up of a reserve 
corps of officers is one of the most vitally 
important steps to be taken. It is abso- 
lutely essential. It takes much time and 
care to train officers. Not only should 
students of the various colleges, univer- 
sities and schools where military training 
is given, be made use of to the fullest 
extent, but the military training camps 
which have been conducted so success- 
fully during the past few years should 
be greatly extended and made a part 
of the general plan of providing officers 
for the officers' reserve corps. It will 

201 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

be necessary to place the instruction at 
these camps on a different basis and to 
combine certain theoretical work with the 
practical work of the camp. This is a 
matter of detail which can be readily 
arranged. The results attained at these 
camps fully justify their being given 
the most serious attention and being 
made a part of the general plan for the 
training of officers. 



202 



CHAPTER IX 

Constructive Work or the Army 

"All civic virtues, all the heroism 
and self-sacrifice of patriotism, spring 
ultimately from the habit men acquire 
of regarding their nation as a great 
organic whole, identifying themselves 
with its fortunes in the past as in the 
present, and looking forward anxiously 
to its future destinies." — Lecke. 

Our people as a whole do not under- 
stand what a tremendous factor our lit- 
tle army has been in the building up 
of the nation and the development of 
its resources from the earliest days. 
They too often think of it only as an 
instrument of destruction. As a mat- 
ter of fact it has been one of the great 
influences in opening up and building 

203 



AMERICA S DUTY 

up the country and maintaining public 
order. Of recent years it has played 
a very great role as an administrative 
force, and in areas under its control great 
advances have been made and lasting 
benefits to humanity secured. 

Before and after the Civil War tlie 
army was the main instrument in the 
maintenance of order, the safeguarding 
of life and in the opening up and pro- 
tection of lines of communication inci- 
dent to the development of the West. 
This period of the army's activity was 
full of fascinating interest; it was 
attended by much hard and dangerous 
work. Even to this day the strongest 
hold the army has upon the affections 
of our western people is the result of 
the work of this period. 

At the outbreak of the Spanish War 
the army entered upon a new field of 

204 



WORK OF THE ARMY 

activity. The war with Spain was not 
a great war. Fighting was limited to 
a few hotly-contested actions in Cuba 
and to some of lesser importance in 
Porto Rico. Immediately upon the ces- 
sation of hostilities the army was con- 
fronted with the necessity of taking over 
the civil administration of the conquered 
territory. This administration was con- 
ducted under the broad authority of mili- 
tary law, but the agency employed was 
the law of the land. It was military for 
the time being, in that its source of 
authority was the power of the military 
occupant. Some deviations in form of 
procedure, due to emergency measures, 
were required, but, generally speaking, 
the municipal law governed in the town 
and city, and the general law of the 
land in the administration of justice and 
the control of administrative procedure. 

205 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

The basic policy was to avoid changes 
in the substantive body of the law, and 
to limit, as far as possible, modifications 
to procedure, with a view to its better- 
ment and simplification, and also to giv- 
ing the accused a larger measure of 
protection. The accomplishment of this 
demanded careful attention. 

The administrative work in Cuba not 
only involved the everyday conduct of 
public business, but an immense amount 
of constructive work incident to the estab- 
lishment of a school system, construction 
of great public works, and of the gen- 
eral laws governing charitable institu- 
tions, as Avell as an enormous amount 
of sanitary organization, an electoral law 
and constructive and administrative work 
to bring about the many changes neces- 
sary to convert a war- wrecked, demor- 
alized and exhausted colony, fever- 

206 



WORK OF THE ARMY 

*"(cken and overrun by disease, into a 

li'-governing republic. 

This great work of the army involved 
not only the maintenance of public order 
and the safeguarding of life and prop- 
erty, but, what was more far-i'eaching, 
the building up of a sourul system of 
sanitation, a system which, when once 
in operation, greatly leduced the death 
rate. Malaria, in its various forms, had 
been one of the great causes of death 
in Cuba. Measures were taken which 
very greatly reduced its ravages among 
the native population and almost elimi- 
nated it from the army. Smallpox had 
been a devastating scourge. This was 
done away with entirely by vaccination 
and the establishment of proper regula- 
tions. Yellow fever, one of the most 
dreaded of all tropical diseases, was 
brought under thorough control, the 

207 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

iiiettiis of transiiiission discovered and 
the method of control worked ont. This 
discovery freed Cnba of the dread dis- 
ease wliich has swept away countless 
thousands oC its popuhition and deci- 
mated the Sj)anish ^^arrisons and the 
Spanish |)()[)ulation tor <>enerati()ns. It 
is a (hscovery of vast importance for all 
time to all hving in the American trop- 
ical and semi-tropical countries. Its 
accomplishment was the work of medical 
othcers of the army under the direction 
of Major Walter Reed. The general 
sanitary work in the Island was under 
the control of an army medical oliicer who 
was directly under the military g-overnor. 
Cuban physicians of great ability cooper- 
ated loyally in the great work of the 
sanitary rehabilitation and rendered 
invaluable service. The discoveries made 
in Cuba and the methods established for 

208 



WORK OF THE ARMY 

the control of yellow fever were adopted 
by other countries and the benefits 
secured are now common to all countries 
formerly ravaged by this disease. The 
saving of life and money in our own 
country incident to doing away with yel- 
low fever and the quarantine that par- 
alyzed the movement of business in the 
entire South, has been many, many times 
the cost of the war. 

In Porto Rico similar work was done 
with reference to malaria and smallpox. 
The same methods were applied as were 
employed in Cuba to control yellow fever. 
The great problem of tropical anemia 
was taken up and solved. A very great 
portion of the credit for this work is due 
to the army, principally to Major Bailey 
K. Ashford, army surgeon, who took 
up the work in Porto Rico and found 
that there was a real cause for what we 

209 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

looked upon as tropical shiftlessness and 
laziness. The cause was the hookworm. 
Most energetic and successful measures 
were taken to combat it. Recent opinion 
is to the effect that the re-energization 
of the working class in Porto Rico inci- 
dent to doing away with tropical anemia 
or hookworm disease, amounts to about 
60 per cent increased efficiency. The 
benefits of this discovery are being 
applied to many tropical and semi-trop- 
ical countries, including our own South. 
It means the re-energization of a great 
mass of the people. The life-saving 
value is tremendous. Each year in Porto 
Rico the reduction in the death rate 
incident to the control of tropical anemia, 
exceeds the total loss by death and 
wounds in the Spanish- American War. 
Important constructive and administra- 
tive work was also accomplished, during 

210 



WORK OF THE ARMY 

the period of military control, much of 
it directly under the military governors 
who were first appointed. 

Similar work, administrative, construc- 
tive and sanitary, was accomplished in 
the Philippines. There for a long time 
the government was under exclusive mili- 
tary control. Much valuable and far- 
reaching sanitary work was done in those 
islands by medical officers of the army. 
This work has been taken up and con- 
tinued by the medical forces of the civil 
government and pushed to a degree of 
success hard to appreciate by those who 
have not seen what has been done. It 
has been a great work, resulting in the 
saving of thousands and thousands of 
lives. 

The construction of the Panama Canal 
was largely army work. It was built 
very largely on a sanitary foundation. 

211 



AMEKICA'S DUTV 

Splendid and effective as has been the 
work of the army engineers, the IViglil- 
ful death toll wonld have prevented tlie 
aeeoniplishinent oT the undertaking* had 
it not been for Keed's discovery con- 
cerning yellow fever and the splendid 
application of the system of prevention 
by Surgeon-Ceneral W^illiam C. Gorgas, 
who made it possible to condnct the 
gigantic work of construction under con- 
ditions — so far as health was concerned 
— equal to those existing in almost any 
portion of the continental United States. 
These great sanitary works in lands 
under our control or taken over bv us, 
alone have saved many times the num- 
ber of lives lost in the war. The benefits 
of these discoveries will be for all time. 
More recently other measures of the 
greatest value in saving human life have 
been taken bv the militarv authorities of 

* • 

212 



WORK OK THE AUMY 

the pfovcrnment in t\\it use of the anti- 
typhoid serum in the army; so efleetive 
has the serum heen that although there 
are more than 100,000 men seatterecJ all 
over the world from Tientsin, Cfiina, to 
Pitnama, ancJ from Porto Ilieo to Alaska, 
in tlie army we did not have a single 
death from typhoid in 1915. 

The universal a[)f>lieation of this pre- 
ventive measure in tlie army has dem- 
onstrated thoroiighly that ty})fioi(J fever 
ean he eompletely eontrolled; that it is 
a preventaf)le (iisease. Its universal 
apj)li(!ation to the military establishment 
was first ma(Je in the United States. 
KriglaruJ first hegan the use of it, hut 
did not make it geneial. 

The army has done tremendous serv- 
ice for tlie country in the handling of 
the gmvc and alarming eoncJitions aris- 
ing from the great Mississippi flood of 

213 



r 



VMERICA S DUTY 



recent years. So quietly was this work 
done that few people appreciate it; thou- 
sands and thousands of people have been 
saved from watery graves or from starva- 
tion. 

Such has been some of the constructive 
and life-saving work of the army. A 
force designed to protect our lives and 
liberties in time of war, in time of peace 
it has always been one of the great fac- 
tors in the development of our own 
countrv and of lands imder our control. 

As has been pointed out again and 
again in the foregoing pages, the train- 
ing which men get in the army, the 
knowledge of sanitation, the respect for 
law and authority, and the habits of 
discipline, are of unestimable value in 
building up a sane and sound people. 
What the army has meant to our people, 
how far-reaching its work has been, is 

214 



WORK OF THE ARMY 

understood by few. It may at times 
fail, and in ^rcat emergency must fail 
unless backed and supported by an organ- 
ized and devoted people who ai)preciate 
that no amount of willingness can take 
th« place of* preparedness and training. 

Behind the reguhu* army must always 
stand the great reserve army consisting 
of the able-bodied men of the nation, so 
trained as to be prom])tly available for 
military service if needed, but following 
their normal occupations in time of peace. 

Any policy which fails to recognize 
the principle of equal obligation and 
equal service is but a makeshift. The 
volunteer system is unworthy of serious 
consideration; not trustworthy because 
it would certainly break down under the 
sudden shock and strain of modern war; 
dangerous because it serves to lull people 
into a false sense of security. 

215 



chapter x 
Lessons of the World War 

"To be prepared for war is one of 
the most effectual means of preserving 
peace/' — Washington. 

Since the foregoing chapters were 
written we have passed through the great 
World War, into whch we drifted un- 
organized, unequipped and unprepared. 
God had given us eyes to see, ears to 
hear and an intelligence to apply the les- 
sons of the past. If we are to judge by 
the condition of America in all that re- 
lates to preparation our eyes had not 
seen, our ears had not heard and cer- 
tainly our intelligence had not applied 
our own experience or that of others. 

216 



LESSONS OF THE WORLD WAR 

Our ultimate, unavoidable entry into 
the War had been for a long time clearly 
evident, unless we were to abandon all 
pretense of defending the rights and in- 
terests of our people, unless we were to 
wliolly fail to meet our obligations to 
humanity as a great Christian nation, 
standing for righteousness and justice, 
and our obligations to civilization for the 
maintenance of good faith and fair deal- 
ing between nations. 

We paid in blood and treasure for our 
failure to prepare. Indeed the world 
paid for it as well as ourselves, for had 
we been reasonably ready and organ- 
ized, had we had reasonable equip- 
ment and supplies — in a word, had we 
been in condition to enter the war with 
reasonable promptness and effectiveness 
— there is little probabihty that the War 
would have taken place. 

217 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

The aggressive enemy nations felt con- 
fident that they could carry out their pur- 
pose before we could intervene effec- 
tively. Only the heroic resistance of Bel- 
gium, the marvelous courage and effect- 
iveness of the French, and the prompt, 
unhesitating and determined entry of 
England prevented the accomplishment 
of their purpose prior to our being able 
to enter the War. 

The opinion of the German military 
experts was that we could not enter into 
any European war effectivelj^ within two 
and one-half years. Generally speaking 
they were right, but fortunately our un- 
conscious and unintentional preparation 
for w^ar, through the building of great 
plants for the manufacture of arms and 
equipment for the fighting nations, 
enabled us to shorten this period some- 
what. The plants which we built for 

218 



LESSONS OF THE WORLD WAR 

them were, to a large extent, made avail- 
able for us almost immediately upon our 
entry into the War. This enabled us to 
push forward preparations more rapidly 
than would otherwise have been the case. 
As it was, it was more than a year after 
we came in before we had any consider- 
able number of troops in action. These 
were our first two divisions. Their air 
service, their artillery, their automatics 
and their machine guns were furnished 
by the Allies — and this despite the fact 
that we are the greatest manufacturing 
nation on earth, and the War had been 
going on nearly four years. 

Up to the time of our entry into the 
War, which was nearly three years after 
the War began, there had been no organ- 
ized, thought-out preparation for war 
on the part of our government and no 
comprehensive scheme to meet the rapidly 

219 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

approaching contingency. The Regular 
Army and the National Guard provided 
a limited number of officers. There were 
a limited number in the Reserve Corps. 

Many of the Regular Army and most 
of the latter classes were not well 
grounded in the methods of modern war. 
Of modern equipment we had little or 
nothing. No adequate plans for pro- 
viding officers had been made. We were 
pathetically and fatally unprepared. 

We paid the price in blood and treas- 
ure for our failure to do what for years 
had been clearly necessary. We were 
strong enough in men and resources to 
pay it, excessive though it was, for it can 
be conservatively stated that our losses 
in men were from a third to a half greater 
than they would have been had we had 
time to train our troops properl}^ and 
that the cost of the war was billions 

220 



LESSONS OF THE WORLD WAR 

greater than it would have been had we 
made even reasonable preparation. 

A dollar spent in preparation before 
the war would have saved many later on. 
We were practically without any air ser- 
vice ; there were no well thought-out plans 
for developing one in any way adequate 
to the demands of the war. Our artillery 
was supplied by the over-taxed Allies, as 
was much in the way of special arms, 
such as automatics, machine-guns, trench 
mortars, etc. Our training camps were 
for months without the necessary arms 
and equipment to train the assembled 
men. Wooden guns and improvised 
equipment were used to the limit. We 
did our best, the Allied line holding while 
we got ready. 

The medical and engineering profes- 
sions of the country had responded years 
before the War to the call to aid in build- 

221 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

ing up a Reserve and were better pre- 
pared to meet the demands than other 
branches of the Service. The Plattsburg 
Training Camps and their winter courses 
furnished a large number of partially 
trained officers. Some were furnished by 
the military training corps of the great 
universities; but these men, valuable as 
they were in starting our training, were 
sadly inadequate in number. 

The crisis of the War was on. We 
had to enter promptly or it would be too 
late. 

We were like a volunteer fire depart- 
ment, called in the midst of a great con- 
flagration — a department short of 
equipment and knowing little or nothing 
of how to use that which it had, a depart- 
ment which had to be organized, equipped 
and trained during the conflagration. 

No nation ever sent braver, more enter- 

222 



LESSONS OF THE WORLD WAR 

prising troops to war — troops more reck- 
lessly indifferent to losses — but they 
were not trained as they should have 
been. Time did not permit it. They 
were not properly equipped to meet the 
denjands of the War. There had been 
no appreciation of the fact that prepara- 
tion must be made in advance — that one 
cannot buy time. These brave troops 
were not given a sporting chance, nor 
will our troops ever be given a sporting 
chance unless we look a bit ahead and 
unless we shape our policy for the future 
with some understanding and apprecia- 
tion of the lessons of the past. We 
demonstrated during the war the mur- 
derous folly of those who talk of raising 
a million men between sunrise and sun- 
set, of men springing to arms who have 
never seen arms or learned how to use 
them, of assuming that words, numbers 

223 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

and money can take the place of organ- 
ization and equipment. 

The question now is : Have we learned 
the lessons thoroughly enough not to 
have to go through the experience of this 
War again. Will our people heed the 
mute appeal of the unnecessary dead of 
this War and of all our previous wars, 
or must the murderous folly of waiting 
until war is upon us to prepare against 
it be a continuing military policy? 

The bending, bleeding line of the Al- 
lies held while we were doing the things 
which plain, common sense indicated 
should have been done years before. For- 
tunately their line held, and we arrived 
in time to throw the determining weight 
of our strength into the struggle. 

Good fortune was with us in the Rev- 
olution, when half of England was on 
our side; in the war of '12 and '14, when 

224 



LESSONS OF THE WORLD WAR 

England was engaged in the great strug- 
gle with Napoleon; in the JNIexican War, 
when we fought an ill-equipped and much 
weaker people; in the Civil War, when 
North and South, equally uninstructed, 
learned the game together; in the Span- 
ish War. when we met a nation even less 
prepared than ourselves; and last, in the 
Great War, when the Allies held the line 
while we got ready, furnishing us thou- 
sands of instructors who brought to us 
the lessons of the war — men whose ser- 
vices were invaluable in the preparation 
of our troops. 

The Allies furnished us our artillery, 
all of our fast fighting air service and 
most of our air service of other types. 
They transported a large portion of our 
troops overseas. Their flags flew over 
the ships which swept the enemy fleets 
from the seas before we entered the war 

225 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

and later in combination with our gallant 
navy waged successful war against the 
submarines, furnishing the bulk of the 
ships so engaged. 

It is not difficult to understand what 
would have happened had we been the 
front line, without support and depend- 
ent entirely upon our own resources. No 
soldier who was engaged in the Great 
War has any doubt in this question. The 
answer is: 

Overwhelming disaster, recovery from 
which would have taken generations. 

If there was any question before, this 
War has demonstrated that oceans are 
no longer effective barriers unless you 
have absolute sea control, but on the con- 
trary are convenient lines of approach 
and of supply. No longer can we look 
to the physical isolation of our country 
as a sufficient protection. We must 

226 



LESSONS OF THE WORLD WAR 

depend upon ourselves for protection 
a7id upon no 07ie else. 

We hope to build up a condition of 
international agreement through which 
war will be greatly diminished. We 
hope to prevent war, but the nations en- 
tering into this agreement must be strong 
and they must be prepared to support the 
right with force, other means failing. We 
must realize that good intentions are of 
little avail unless supported by a reso- 
lute and strong spirit, and the organized 
strength of the people. 

We are today the leading nation of the 
world. We have tremendous responsi- 
bility. We love justice and practice fair 
dealing, but if we are to be of the great- 
est value in the maintenance of world 
peace we must be not only righteous but 
strong. 

We are well out of this War, although 

227 



AMERICAS DUTY 

il luis cost us liciivily in iiniiecessary sac- 
rifice of life and treasure. Otiier wars 
will come. We wish it were not so, but 
we have no suilicient reason to believe 
that our wishes will be fully realized. We 
are and always have been desirous of 
peace. We believe in jirbitration more 
lirndy th;m ever, but we must remem- 
ber {\u\[ if we ai-e lo be eireclive in the 
buildin/^ up of arbitration we must not 
only love justice and priictice fair deal- 
in/4\ but we must be ort^nnized and strong 
ready to promptly apply our strength. 
If the |)redat()ry nation, oi* group of 
nations, knows thnt we c;innot effectively 
enter our protest in the shape of our 
armed forces without years of |)repara- 
tion our voice will hav^e rehitively small 
weight in the world's councils. 

We do not want the largest army in 
the world. W(* want one big enougli for 

228 



J.KSSONS OF TIIK WORLD WAR 

the peace needs of the nation. We want 
it to he tlie hest army in exislenee. So 
it is with the navy. It shonld he, not 
necessarily tlie hirgest, hnt the best navy 
in the world. To have such forces 
re(|ilires the l)est and most inspiring* lead- 
ership, the hi<>hest de^L^ree of morale, and 
forces thoroughly trained in field and 
iket maneuvers. i\n ellieient navy 
recpiires not only a thor()u<^hly ellieient 
personnel, hut the veiy hest in ships and 
e(pn*pment and all the accessories of a 
fil^htin^' fleet. It must he maintained on 
a basis of instant readiness. Such a navy 
must be strong- enough to play its part 
effectively in any war of a<^gression 
which may he waged against us. Rack 
of the land and sea forces must !)e the 
organized strength of the nation. 

The conduct of the War demonstrated 
I hat we had no well thought-out plan for 

229 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

making use not only of the manpower 
of the nation, but the power of our 
people as a whole — our resources, trans- 
portation, strength in the line of manu- 
facture and construction. All this had to 
be co-ordinated after we entered the War. 

The organization of the material 
resources of the country, to the extent 
of knowing where and how we are going 
to secure supplies, is almost as important 
as the training of the men. Indeed, 
unless our material resources are organ- 
ized and preparation is made to secure 
an output adequate for the needs of war, 
the training of the men will be unavail- 
ing, for they will have nothing to fight 
with. 

The organization of a nation to resist 
aggression, as has been already pointed 
out, is a very broad and comprehensive 
proceeding. It includes the moral organ- 

230 



LESSONS OF THE WORLD WAR 

ization of the people; the building up of 
a sense of citizenship responsibility on 
the part of all to serve where they can 
best serve. It is not for the citizen of a 
constitutional democracy such as ours to 
say where he is to serve or how, but it 
is for him to serve wherever he is sent, to 
the very best of his physical and mental 
ability. The implanting in the minds of 
our people of this principle is a very im- 
portant part of our organization for the 
defense of the country. Organization 
also includes the building up of the phy- 
sical well-being of our people, taking the 
necessary steps to see that they are sound 
in mind and body, that all remediable 
defects are corrected. This is important 
not only for war, but it is even more 
important to the economic efficiency of 
our people in time of peace. 

The organization of the nation must 
231 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

include safeguarding it against the 
entrance of anarchistic, destructive 
forces; of the physically or mentally 
unfit, and of racial types which cannot 
intermarry with and be absorbed in our 
population; of racial groups which can- 
not be assimilated. It includes the thor- 
ough information of our people as to 
what our rights and obligations are, and 
the building up of a sound, national con- 
science, one which will make America 
quickly responsive to the call of duty. It 
embraces the building up of a strong, 
intense national spirit — not a narrow, 
selfish one but one which, while charit- 
able and helpful, is nevertheless intensely 
American, and the avoidance of loose- 
fibred internationalism, which means 
national death. It also includes the 
Americanization of the newcomer and 
such of the native-born as are, speaking 

232 



LESSONS OF THE WORLD WAR 

in terms of citizenship responsibility, 
slackers. It means the preaching of 
Americanism from the pulpit, in the 
schoolroom, on the street; the building 
up of a spirit of national solidarity, 
which is founded upon the establishment 
of human and just relations between cap- 
ital and labor; the rigid repression of 
autocracy, whether it be that of capital 
or of labor; the maintenance of a sound 
system of public education; the mainten- 
ance of courts which are unafraid and 
unaffected by politics, assuring the citi- 
zens of equality before the law without 
reference to race or creed; strict adher- 
ence to our Constitution. These are 
some of the things which America stands 
for, and when we preach and talk Amer- 
icanism it should be with a view to the 
thorough establishment and firm mainte- 
nance of these principles and policies. 

233 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

The Aincricanism wc preach must not be 
mere theatrical bombast; it must be prac- 
tical and constructive and active. 

We must remember that we cannot 
buy time. No amount of wealth will 
build anus and equipment over night. 
Tlie weapons and equipment of war mnst 
be built and ready and the training of 
the men nnist be done in time of peace. 
^Vn equal opportunity must be given to 
all men of suitable age and physical 
condition to take such training as w^ill 
fit them to be officers if they have the 
ability. It would be most nnwise to 
limit our supply of offieei's to those wlio 
come from the institutions of higher edu- 
cation. All our youth mnst be given an 
ecpial opportunity to win, in competition, 
commissions, if they have the ability and 
qnalities of leadership). Inevitably, edu- 
cate)?! will tell, and the bulk of our offi- 

234 



LESSONS OF THE WORLD WAR 

cers will be men who have had a reason- 
ably good education. 

If a full opportunity to compete is 
not given to all our youth who are sound 
in mind and body we shall create a feel- 
in^ that the leaders, the officer class, are 
going to come from the families of those 
who have the money and the means to 
extend to their children unusual facilities 
in the way of education. 

Of course, broadly speaking, no man 
should become an officei- who has not the 
essentials of an elementary education. 
Tie must be able to read and write and 
to express himself clearly, to understand 
orders and be able to transmit them. 

To be an officer one should also have 
the qualities of leadership. No amount 
of education will replace these. On 
the other hand, marked qualities of lead- 
ership often outweigh educational defects. 

235 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

See General Forest in the Civil War. 

No system will be found to be effec- 
tive in the great crises which depends 
upon the volunteer principle. Service 
must rest absolutely upon equality of 
obligation. We must all serve some- 
where — wherever we can best serve. 

We must adopt some system of train- 
ing which will bear equally upon all who 
are fit — a period of intensive training 
not to exceed six months — and com- 
bine with it a certain amount of citi- 
zenship, instruction and industrial train- 
ing. All who come to these camps must 
be taught to speak English, and to read 
and write, if they are unable to do so. 
The short period of intensive training 
does not apply to the officers nor to 
many of the noncommissioned officers. 
The men who become officers and non- 
commissioned officers are those who have 

236 



LESSONS OF THE WORLD WAR 

shown special fitness — those who are 
keenly interested in military training. 
They will go on from year to year as 
Reserve Officers, seeking promotion 
through preparation and efficiency in ser- 
vtce, very much as the better officers of 
the National Guard have done in the 
past. From them will come the great 
bulk of the officers who will be the in- 
structors in whatever system of training 
we may adopt for the youth of the coun- 
try. Those who do not care to continue 
in the Reserve Corps will eventually pass 
into the unorganized reserve ; those whose 
interest is keen will go on and eventually 
reach the higher grades in the Reserve 
Corps. 

The war of the future is going to 
require even more of organization, both 
moral and material, than the wars of the 
past. The weapons of war are yearly 

237 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

becoming more powerful and more intri- 
cate and require more skill and trainng 
to use them effectively. 

We have entered effectively two new 
fields of effort; the aerial field and the 
submarine field. Both have tremendous 
importance; in both great developments 
are being and will be made. The appli- 
ances in each require time to construct 
and great skill n operation. In other 
words, as the years go by the char- 
acter of war becomes more and more 
one which requires organization and pre- 
paration in advance. Less and less may 
be left to chance. 

We must remember that all this prep- 
aration is but an insurance against war 
and an added force in our struggle for 
world peace, founded on righteousness. 
Thus far we have not engaged in a war 
in which we have had to meet, single- 

238 



LESSONS OF THE WORLD WAR 

handed and unaided, a first-class power. 
Some day we shall have to, in spite of 
all our efforts for peace. 

The probability of war being forced 
upon us will be much less if the world 
knows that we, the champions of peace 
and fair deahng, are both able and ready 
to meet the organized forces of wrong 
with the disciplined strength of right. 

The Great War has verified the fore- 
casts made in the earlier chapters of this 
book. Shall other wars do the same? 
Shall we blunder on, paying unneces- 
sarily in blood and treasure, lacking in 
weight in the world's councils, ineffect- 
ive in the maintenance of world peace? 

We shall, unless the world knows that, 
all efforts for righteous peace having 
failed, we stand ready and prepared to 
defend the right with our resources, with 
our bodies, if necessary with our lives. 

239 



APPENDIX 

THE AUSTRALIAN SYSTEM OF 
DEFENSE. 

Prior to 1870 the main defense of Australia 
was in the hands of the British troops quartered 
in the leading cities; the primary purpose of these 
troops was to serve as a convict guard. When- 
ever war appeared to be imminent volunteer corps 
were organized. 

All British troops were withdrawn in 1870, 
and small detachments of permanent forces were 
formed as a nucleus around which it was pro- 
posed to shape a citizen soldiery. In 1883-1884 
a partially paid volunteer militia was organized. 
There was established at this time a system of 
military instruction in the schools for boys. This 
cadet system had attained considerable develop- 
ment, but had not reached the class of boys who 
fail for any reason to attend these schools, and 
was purely of a volunteer nature. In 1903 the 
volunteer system was extended by providing for 
the military training of the youth not attending 
school, and who were authorized to form a part 

240 



APPENDIX 

of the land defense of the country. This sys- 
tem for both the general forces and the cadet 
forces proved unsatisfactory, so that in 1909 a 
statute was passed making both the cadet system 
and the adult system compulsory. This act of 1909 
did not become eifective until June 30, 1911, on 
which date the volunteer system ceased, and on the 
following day the compulsory provisions of this 
act became effective. They divided the military 
and naval forces of the Commonwealth into "per- 
manent" and "citizen" forces — the former bound 
to service for a term, the latter not so bound. 
Until 1911 they were divided into militia who 
were paid and volunteers who were not ordinarily 
paid for their services, with a reserve who had 
done active service. 

Until Julj'^ 1, 1911, when compulsory training 
went into effect under the Act of 1909, enlistment 
in time of peace was voluntary. All male inhabit- 
ants between 18 and 60 were liable to service in 
time of war within the territorial limits of Austra- 
lia only, and, in addition, cadet corps, in which 
were enrolled schoolboys under 12 years of age 
and youths l^etween 14 and 19 not attending 
school, were established. These corps were not 
liable for active service. 

The Act of 1909 was the direct outcome of the 
feeling shared by all classes in the community 

241 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

that the defense of Australia was insecure under a 
voluntary system; section 125 of this Act provides: 
All male inhabitants of Australia 
(excepting those who are exempted by 
this Act), who have resided therein 
foT six months and are British subjects, 
shall be liable to be trained as follows : 
(a) From 12 to 14 years of age in the 
junior cadets; (b) From 14 to 18 years 
of age in the senior cadets; (c) From 
18 to 26 years of age in the citizen 
forces ; provided that, except in time of 
imminent danger or war, the last year 
of service in the citizen forces shall be 
limited to one registration or one muster 
parade. 
The Acts of 1910-1913 merely extended or 
curtailed certain minor provisions of the Act of 
1909. To-day the system is substanially as fol- 
lows: 

On July 1st of his 12th year every Australian 
boy who has been officially declared physically, 
mentally and morally lit, starts his training as a 
junior cadet. He is furnished with a hat, shirt, 
breeches, puttees and shoes, and is given a mini- 
mum of 90 hours' elementary military training for 
each of two years. In his 14th year he becomes 
a senior cadet — his fundamental military train- 

242 



APPENDIX 

ing for four years^ with an annual minimum of 
four 4-hour drills^ twelve 2-hotir drills and twenty- 
four 1-hour drills in marching, discipline, the hand- 
ling of arms, physical drill, guard duty and minor 
tactics. A cadet rifle and belt are added to his 
"junior" uniform, and 10 per cent of the best 
shots are given target practice with the service 
rifle. In his nineteenth year the youth becomes a 
member of the "citizen forces." He receives two 
woolen shirts, two pairs of breeches, overcoat, hat, 
sleeping cap, two pairs of leggings, two pairs of 
shoes, a kit bag, rifle and baj^onet. In the "citi- 
zen forces" the minimum annual instruction must 
reach an equivalent of sixteen whole days' drill, 
not less than eight of which must be in camps of 
continuous training. 

From the senior cadets the youth is assigned to 
that arm of the "citizen forces" to which he seems 
best fitted and in which he is most interested, and 
is given infantry and cavalry drill, or staff corps 
training until he is 25 years of age. In his 26th 
year he is required to attend one muster parade 
only, and is then discharged from "active" service. 
He remains, however, subject to recall to the colors 
in time of war untill he becomes 60 years of age. 
If he is declared proficient at the end of each 
year's training by a board of officers convened to 
pass judgment, he has received twelve years of 

243 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

systematic progressive military training. To win 
his discharge he must hold twelve annual certifi- 
cates of proficiency — a failure to pass the efficiency 
board means a repetition of that year of training. 
Promotions in the "citizens" forces are absolutely 
by merit, the principle adopted being that "the 
best soldiers must lead, whatever their civil avoca- 
tion or birth." The population of Australia of 
military age is about 500,000. Exemptions and 
rejections average about 10 per cent for senior 
cadets and 33 1-3 per cent for "citizen forces." 
The number under training when the system is in 
full sway will give 100,000 senior cadets and 
120,000 "citizen" soldiers. The available trained 
force of Australia will in the course of a few years 
approximate 300,000 men. 

Under the Defense Acts the following classes of 
exemptions exist: Persons physically, mentally 
or morally unfit, members and officers of parlia- 
ment, judges, police, prison employees, ministers 
of religion, lighthouse keepers, and physicians and 
nurses of public hospitals. The governor gen- 
eral may by proclamation vary or extend these 
exemptions, or he may exempt specified areas. 
Persons whose religion or belief prohibits them 
from bearing arms may be exempted from service 
in the combatant branches, but are liable for serv- 
ice in the supply departments; aiKl in every case 

244 



APPENDIX 

the burden or proof rests upon the person claiming 
exemption. The parent or guardian who fails to 
register a son or ward of service age, or the em- 
ployer who interferes in any way with the military 
service of his employees, although he is not required 
to pay an employee for time absent on military 
dufy, is liable to a heavy fine, and the boy or man 
who is absent from a formation may be fined or 
imprisoned. 

Should the Congress of the United States pass 
the proposed act to partially pay our organized 
militia, our system of defense will be practically 
that which was long ago abandoned by Australia 
as "insecure." The effect of the present system 
is the constant maintenance of an adequate, trained 
force, which is under the direct control of the 
commonwealth in time of emergency. 

The government maintains "area officers" who 
look after registration and enrollment of the avail- 
able recruits in their districts, and it supplies its 
forces with a simple, inexpensive uniform, but no 
pay. 

The young men of Australia give a small amount 
of their time to the service of their country, and 
in return receive the best kind of mental and 
physical training at the most receptive period of 
their lives. The expense to the government is 
small, the benefits derived by it and the individuals 

245 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

it accepts for training are many and important. 

The foregoing is a brief synopsis of the Austra- 
lian system. It will be noted that to apply this 
system in this country , where practically the entire 
matter of education is in the hands of forty-eight 
state governments instead of being in the hands 
of the general government^ will require consider- 
able modification for its practical application. As 
a matter of fact practically the greater portion of 
the inherent difficulties attending the securing of 
efficiency in the militia will have to be overcome 
in the establishment of an efficient system of mili- 
tary training of any kind that is undertaken by 
our government. It is not believed that these 
difficulties will be insurmountable if the people of 
the country can be made to realize the inherent 
defects in our j^i'^sent system, and our actual 
inability to organize even a protective defensive 
force in this country. By this effective organi- 
zation is understood, of course, an organization 
that can be completed in time to be of use under 
modern conditions. The following ideas are 
deemed to be essential to efficiency in any system 
of defense that may be adopted, viz: 

1. Absolute and unqualified control by the central 

or responsible power. 

2. A nation-wide appreciation of the needs of 

the country in the form of national defense. 

246 



APPENDIX 

3. The actual training and organization of a 

sufficient number of regular troops to act 
as an expeditionary force or as a retaining 
force until the citizen soldiers, whether 
cadets or militia, can be mobilized. 

4. That this citizen force, composed as it must 
• be of militia and students, shall be not only 

trained, but organized into fixed defensive 
units, at all times whether in peace or war, 
under the control and subject to the direct 
call of the President as Commander in Chief 
of the Land and Naval Forces. 



24T 



THE SWISS SYSTExM OF DEFENSE. 

"Nothing is more powerful, happier, 
or more praiseworthy^ than a State 
which possesses a very great number 
of trained soldiers. The independence 
of the Swiss Confederation rests not 
upon assurances or promises of em- 
perors or kings, it rests on a founda- 
tion of iron — that of our swords." 

The Swiss have always recognized the necessity 
of universal military service, and as early as 
1291 it appears that all who did not serve — even 
widows and nuns — were subject to a special tax. 
From a military policy based upon hurried levies 
when war appeared to be imminent, and which 
were as broken reeds in action, the Swiss in 1874 
passed laws which form the basis of the present 
system. The laws of 1874 have from time to time 
been modified in many minor respects. 

Today every Swiss schoolboy, from the time he 
enters school until he is graduated, is given a 
systematic course of athletic training to fit him for 
his later military service. This training, which is 

248 



APPENDIX 

progressive and prescribed by the federal govern- 
ment, although directly supervised by the canton 
authorities, is followed in every public and private 
school and institution for boys in Switzerland. The 
minimum time devoted to this instruction is two 
hours a week for the younger classes, and three 
hours a week for the older. 

Upon leaving school the young man may vol- 
unteer for a course in preliminary training. He 
receives from 50 to 80 hours a year in athletics, 
marching, care and use of the service rifle and tar- 
get practice to include 300 metres. This course 
is purely voluntary, and is largely gone into by 
those who hope to win a commission in the Swiss 
forces. 

In his 20th year, if examination finds him 
morally, mentally and physically fit, inust be 
enrolled as a member of the recruit class of the 
local battalion of the "Elite," or First Line. He 
is furnished \vith a simple service uniform and 
receives pay at the rate of 16 cents per day. In 
his recruit year the Swiss receives from 60 to 90 
days of military training, depending upon the 
branch of the army he enters, by instructor-officers 
of the permanent establishment. Every year 
after the recruit year, he, as a soldier of the First 
Line, returns to the colors for at least 11 days of 
"review" instruction. He retains his uniform, rifle 

249 



AMERICA'S DUTY 

and equipment in his immediate possession, and 
since all other impedimenta is kept at the head- 
quarters of the local organization, the details of 
mobilization are greatly simplified. 

Upon reaching the age of 32 the First Line 
soldier is transferred to the Landwehr, or Second 
Line, and at 48 to the Landsturm or Third Line. 
The Landwehr is a feeder for the Elite, and is 
itself fed from the Landsturm. 

Officers are made through merit, are given 
special courses, and retained in "active" service 
for longer periods. The law permits no soldier 
to decline promotion with its added responsibilities 
in either the commissioned or noncommissioned 
grades. 

The government encourages the formation of 
rifle clubs and competitions among them in every 
possible way, and officers of the Second and Third 
Lines make it a practice to assemble often for 
tactical discussions and war games. 

Every soldier is insured against sickness, accident 
or death by the government while under instruction 
or while engaged in any military duty. 

Certain classes are exempted from active serv- 
ice in time of peace, as members of the Federal 
Council, ministers of religion (except the nec- 
essary chaplains), prison wardens, frontier guards, 
police, personnel of public hospitals, and rail- 

250 



APPENDIX 

road and steamship employees, but are liable for 
service in time of war in their professional capa- 
cities. The morally and physically unfit are not 
permitted to serve, but are required to pay a special 
income tax in lieu of service. 

in one sense it may be said that Switzerland has 
no standing army, as its permanent establishment 
consists of a general staff and a small number of 
territorial recruiting supply and instructor officers; 
yet with a population of 4,000,000 in the year 
1912 it had a fully organized and equipped, well 
trained and disciplined force of 490,430 men in- 
stantly available. The military expenses of the 
Government for that year were $8,229,941, or 
$16.77 per man. 

While the obligatory military service of the boys 
is extremely short in contrast with that of the 
great European powers, it must be remembered 
that the boy has been receiving military instruc- 
tions for a number of years, that he has been 
acquiring a good body and familiarity with the 
rifle and a high moral sense of his obligation to his 
country, so that when he comes to the colors he 
has already absorbed a large proportion of the 
training which the recruit has to receive after 
joining the colors in other armies. 

Physical training forms an essential part of this 
preliminary work, and the training is uniform 

251 



AMERICA'S DUTY ^j?-"^ 

throughout the country, as it coiild be here, it all 
being based upon the calisthenic methods prescribed 
by the army regulations. Practically all of this 
instruction is given by the male teacher of the 
public schools. Rifle shooting is encouraged 
throughout the country, as it should be here. 



252 /^-^H-^j^ 



